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NOTES
SOVEREIGNTY BY SUFFERANCE: THE ILLUSION OF
INDIAN TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
INTRODUCTION
In his first inaugural address, President Andrew Jackson stated
that the Cherokees would receive "as much 'humane and considerate
attention to their rights' as was 'consistent with the habits of our Gov-
ernment and the feelings of our people.' "1 Echoing this statement,
the Supreme Court noted in In re Mayfield that Congress would allow
the inhabitants of Indian Country "such power of self-government as
was thought to be consistent with the safety of the white population
with which they may have come in contact, and to encourage them as
far as possible in raising themselves to our standard of civilization."
3
While these statements may sound callous to the modem ear, they
accurately reflect the basic approach of the United States government
towards Indian tribes.4 They also demonstrate that tribal sovereignty
is subject to the whim of Congress and is therefore not true sover-
eignty but sovereignty by sufferance.
5
The status of Indian Nations in the United States today has been
called "quasi-sovereignty." 6 Although the federal government recog-
nizes the various tribes as sovereign peoples with some rights of self-
determination,7 it subordinates their authority to govern themselves
1 Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 STA. L.
REv. 500, 504 (1969) (discussing the political, legal, and moral issues surrounding the
Supreme Court's decisions in the Cherokee cases). Although Jackson was concerned with
removing the Cherokee Nation from its land in Georgia to Oklahoma, the sentiment ap-
plies equally to any of the Indian nations.
2 141 U.S. 107 (1891).
3 Id. at 115-16.
4 "The study of Native American history teaches that the overriding, but rarely articu-
lated, policy of Canada and the United States towards Aboriginals was to get them out of
the way so their land could be settled and developed by whites." Ralph W.Johnson, Fragile
Gains: Two Centuries of Canadian and United States Policy Toward Indians, 66 WAsH. L. RE".
643, 649 (1991).
5 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) ("The sovereignty that the In-
dian tribes retain is of a unique and limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of
Congress and is subject to complete defeasance."). See also Richard B. Collins, Indian Con-
sent to American Government; 31 Aviz. L. REv. 365, 369-70 (1989) (discussing and questioning
whether Indians have actually consented to be governed by the United States).
6 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978) (holding that tribal
sovereignty does not extend to the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over a non-Indian for
crimes committed on tribal land).
7 See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
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and their land to that of Congress. Thus, in many locations within the
borders of the United States there exist three sovereigns-the Indian
Nations, the individual states, and the federal government-all with
uncertain powers with respect to each other. This situation causes se-
vere conflicts of interest in which the federal and state governments,
the more powerful sovereigns, normally prevail and effectively erode
the sovereign base of the Indian Tribes.
This Note argues that the constant erosion of the remnants of
tribal sovereignty is the result of the lack of definition and consent in
the current tribal-federal-state relationship. Furthermore, it proposes
a system to re-establish the sovereign base of the Indian Nations. The
foundation of this system would consist of free association agree-
ments, which would create a new and clearly defined relationship be-
tween the tribal, federal and state governments. These agreements
would provide a basis for consensual dealings between three equal
and coexisting sovereigns. Such agreements would return at least
some of the sovereign rights that the current system has stolen from
the Indian Nations.
Consent would be the touchstone of the agreements. Any limita-
tion of a nation's sovereign authority must take its legitimacy from
consensual arrangements between countries. Thus, consent is a nec-
essary aspect of any relationship between governments. Congress,
however, currently does not need the consent of the tribes before leg-
islating with respect to them.8 Since the tribes may neither accept nor
reject the actions of Congress, they do not control their own destiny
and thus, are not sovereign in any meaningful sense of the word. The
current relationship is one of control, not consent.
Definition is the other necessary aspect of intergovernmental re-
lations. If two governments reach an agreement, it is important that
they rigorously define the scope of the agreement. If the parties do
not establish their respective rights and obligations it is impossible to
develop methods for dealing with conflicts. In the current tribal-fed-
eral relationship, the rights and obligations of the tribes change when-
ever the federal government alters its policy or the state governments
push for more control over the tribes. The tribal right of self-govern-
8 The United States government currently enjoys plenary power over the Indian
tribes. There is no single, definitive explanation of the legal source for such complete
authority. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886) (the trust relation-
ship and the dependent status of the tribes provides the authority); McClanahan v. Arizona
State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1973) (Commerce Clause and treaty-making
power are the source of federal power). In practice, the "plenary power" of Congress has
been used to authorize the taxation of tribes, to grantjurisdiction over crimes committed
on the reservation, and even to terminate the separate status of some tribes. For an in-
depth look at the plenary power doctrine, see NellJ. Newton, FederalPower OverIndians: Its
Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 195 (1984).
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ment remains undefined and, consequently, there is neither security
for the tribes, nor any limitation on the changes that can be imposed
by the state and federal governments. Thus, without both consent
and definition, tribal sovereignty is an uncertain and malleable
concept.
Part I of this Note discusses concepts of tribal sovereignty and
conflicts of sovereignty by examining the oscillating nature of rela-
tions between the tribal, federal, and state governments throughout
United States history. As part of this background discussion, it exam-
ines three cases: Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,9 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe,'0 and Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reser-
vation." These cases chronicle the struggles that occur when one sov-
ereign power attempts to operate from under the blanket of another's
authority. Part II develops the idea that tribal sovereignty is an illu-
sion by examining the effects that lack of definition and consent have
had on the current regime. Part III introduces the principle of self-
determination and its significance to the Indian tribes. Finally, Part
IV proposes free association agreements and compacts as a solution to
the problem of sovereignty erosion. These agreements would infuse
definition and consent into the tribal-federal relationship, giving In-




TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTlY AND CONFLICrS OF SOVEREIGNTY
A traditional definition of "sovereignty" is: "The supreme, abso-
lute, and uncontrollable power by which any independent state is gov-
erned."' 3 Questions regarding the sovereign rights of tribes are often
the starting point of any federal Indian law issue. Although the whole
9 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (holding that treaty provisions cannot limit the plenary power
of Congress over tribal relations and lands).
10 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (ruling that Indian Nations do not retain the inherent sover-
eign power to assert criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians because their sovereign author-
ity is diminished as a necessary result of their dependant status).
11 447 U.S. 134 (1980) (concluding that the State of Washington may validly impose
taxes on cigarette sales made on the tribal reservation to nonmembers).
12 This Note does not discuss the illegality of the United States' treatment of Indian
tribes or argue for their acceptance into the international community as full sovereigns.
The purpose of this Note is to propose and analyze a solution to the current weakness of
Native American sovereignty in the United States which accepts the realities of relations
between three sovereigns of unequal power occupying the same territory. Although this
solution would not create independent, wholly sovereign tribal nations, it would lay the
groundwork for a system which would re-establish the foundation of Indian sovereignty
and self-determination in North America.
13 BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1396 (6th ed. 1990).
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of federal Indian law is quite complex,14 the essence of tribal sover-
eignty is simply the extent to which a tribe can attend to its own affairs
and control its own cultural, societal, and economic development free
from outside restraints. Under the current legal and political re-
gimes, the extent of tribal control is ambiguous. The Handbook of Fed-
eral Indian Law lists three "fundamental principles" that demonstrate
the anomalous and restricted nature of tribal sovereignty: (1) Indian
tribes possess all the powers of a sovereign state; (2) conquest renders
the tribes subject, however, to the legislative authority of the United
States and terminates the tribes' external sovereign powers, but does
not affect the internal sovereign powers of the tribes; and (3) these
powers are subject to qualification by treaties and congressional
legislation.' 5
Cohen's three principles demonstrate the dichotomy between in-
ternal and external sovereignty16 that pervades the concept of tribal
sovereignty. Tribes are supposedly full sovereigns with respect to their
own internal affairs and interests. At the same time, however, the
United States government has completely extinguished their external
sovereign powers.17 This state of affairs might not be problematic if
defined standards for maintaining the relationship between the tribal
and federal governments existed and the relationship were based
upon the consent of the tribes. The history of tribal-federal relations
demonstrates, however, that neither standards nor consent exist, and
that the relationship is uncertain at best.
Tribal-federal relations have periodically oscillated between two
diametrically opposed views on the status of Indian Tribes. At one
end of the spectrum is the belief that tribes are independent political
communities and should control their own development.'8 At the
other end lies the belief that the tribal system should be dismantled
and individual Indians should be assimilated into the greater Ameri-
14 For an example of the complexities of federal Indian law, see Robert N. Clinton,
Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARiz. L.
Ray. 503 (1976) (discussing the confusing question of criminal jurisdiction in Indian
country).
15 FELrx S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 241-42 (1982).
16 The concept of internal versus external sovereignty is central to an understanding
of federal Indian law. Internal sovereignty encompasses the authority of a government
over its own people and affairs. The levying of taxes and the punishment of crimes are
prime examples of "internal" sovereign authority. External sovereignty, on the other
hand, involves the powers possessed by a government with respect to other sovereign enti-
ties. The making of international treaties is an example of external sovereignty. See, e.g.,
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408,
424-28 (1989) (discussing the internal-external dichotomy of tribal power).
17 Id. at 426.
18 This end of the spectrum may exist only in theory. It is questionable whether the
tribes have ever been viewed as fully separate and independent political entities.
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can society.19 While these views appear to be in extreme conflict,
their implementation produces very similar results. The United States
government dominates the tribal-federal relationship, allowing it to
manipulate the situation to protect federal interests. The following
historical background will demonstrate how the lack of definition and
consent in the relationship promotes federal dominance.
A. A Brief History of Tribal-Federal Relations
The European powers conducted their early dealings with the
tribes of North America on a government-to-government basis, recog-
nizing the independent sovereign authority of the Indian Nations.20
This recognition led to the practice of entering into treaties with the
tribes, a practice that the colonies continued when they became the
United States of America.21 This approach made sense for the early
settlers, who were small in number and often depended upon the
larger Indian tribes for protection from the smaller tribes on whose
land they had encroached. 22 These early relations were the last time
that Indian tribes held the status of truly independent sovereigns. In-
deed, these early treaties represent the last time that their relation-
ships with non-Indians were well defined and at least partially
consensual. Significant cultural differences and the settlers' cries for
land soon generated conflicts that resulted in the elimination of much
of tribal sovereignty. These increasing conflicts are evident in the
three "Marshall decisions," which are considered the "classic pro-
nouncements of the theoretical underpinnings upon which [federal
Indian law] is based."23 Thus, any discussion of the modem concep-
tion of Indian tribal sovereignty must begin with an examination of
these three cases.
1. The Marshall Cases
The Marshall cases provided the first legal interpretations of tri-
bal status and the tribal-federal relationship. 24 The first of these cases,
19 Johnson, supra note 4, at 654-66; Robert W. McCoy, The Doctrine of Tribal Sovereignty:
Accommodating Tribal, State, and Federal Interests, 13 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 357, 369-76
(1978); WiumAm C. CANBY, JR., AMERicAN INDIAN LAw IN A Nurrsimu 9-31 (2d ed. 1988).
20 Rachel San Kronowitz et al., Note, Toward Consent and Cooperation: Reconsidering The
Political Status of Indian Nations, 22 HAuv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 507, 511-12 (1987).
21 VINE DELORiA, JR. & CLIFFoRD M. LyrtE, AmERIcAN INDIANs, AMERIcANJusTCE 3-4
(1983).
22 Id. at 3.
23 Id. at 33.
24 Sharon O'Brien, Tribes and Indians: With Whom Does The United States Maintain a
Relationship?, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1461, 1464 (1991). This legal interpretation is, of
course, the interpretation of the United States government and, consequently, says very
little about how the tribes would describe the relationship.
408 [Vol. 79:404
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Johnson v. M'Intosh,25 involved a dispute over the validity of two appar-
ently legitimate sources of title to the same tract of land. The plain-
tiffs claimed title to the land through a direct purchase from the
Piankeshaw and other Indian tribes, while the defendants claimed ti-
tle through a grant by the United States government.26 The Supreme
Court held that the government possessed the only valid title because
the Indian nations were not free to sell their land to whomever they
chose. They could only sell it to the European sovereign who "discov-
ered" the land and thus held title to it.2 7 The Court explained that
through the effects of this "discovery doctrine," "the rights of the orig-
inal inhabitants were, in no instance, entirely disregarded; but were
necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired.... [T]heir rights to
complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily dimin-
25 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
26 Id. at 543-62.
27 Id. at 573. The Spanish, and later the other European nations, followed the advice
of Spanish theologian Francisco de Vitoria, who determined that the natives were the true
owners of the land and concluded that absent a "just war" that land could not be taken
without their consent. DELORIA & LYrLE, supra note 21, at 3. The upshot of this view was
that the desired land was not terra nullius, land both unoccupied and unacquired, and,
consequently, a European nation could not claim it through the doctrine of "discovery."
The traditional view of the "discovery doctrine" is that the discoverer may lay claim to
terra nullius merely by effectively occupying it. JAMEs CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES
IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 173 (1979). If land is not terra nullius, then a nation may only
acquire that land through cession or conquest. Id. at 174. In contrast to these views, Jus-
tice Marshall held that the "discovery doctrine" did apply. According to Marshall's view of
the doctrine, any sovereign that "discovered" a land not previously known to Christian
peoples gained title to that land against all other European nations. Johnson v. M'Intosh,
21 U.S. at 573-76.
Marshall's version of the discovery doctrine modified the traditional view of terra nul-
lis by applying the doctrine to an occupied land. The basis for this modification was the
idea that the Indians were non-Christian and uncivilized peoples, and so, did not own the
land they occupied. Id. at 576-77 (referring to natives as "heathen" peoples). To further
support his position, Marshall asserted that the discovery doctrine, as he defined it, had
been accepted by the nations of Europe and so was part of international law. Id. at 584.
Vitoria never accepted this view, however, nor did other important international law theo-
rists. See Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Medieval and Renaissance Origins of the Status of the
American Indian in Western Legal Thought, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 70-71 n.300 (1983) (describ-
ing the lack of historical foundation for Chief Justice Marshall's view of the discovery doc-
trine). Indeed, the nations of Europe apparently did not follow this view of the discovery
doctrine. See, e.g., Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 39 (Advisory Opinion of October 16)
("[s] tate practice of the relevant period indicates that territories inhabited by tribes or peo-
ples having a social and political organization were not regarded as terrae nullius ... West-
ern Sahara was inhabited by peoples which, if nomadic, were socially and politically
organized in tribes and under chiefs competent to represent them."). Thus, Justice Mar-
shall's use of the discovery doctrine deviated from the principles of that period's interna-
tional law and "probably was invented to solve expediently the difficult question raised in
MIntosh as to the supraconstitutional source of the federal government's authority to ac-
quire lands from Indian tribes." Williams, supra, at 71 n.300.
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ished."28 Thus, the Court reduced the Indians' sovereign title over
their land to a mere right of occupancy.29
The next case, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,30 involved an action
brought by the Cherokee Nation prevent the State of Georgia from
enforcing legislation that sought to dissolve the Cherokee Nation,
bring it under the laws of the State, and distribute its lands among
various counties within Georgia. 3' In a decision that would shape the
contours of future tribal-federal relations, Justice Marshall refused ju-
risdiction over the case on the grounds that the Indian Nations were
not foreign nations.3 2 He determined that the tribes were "domestic
dependent nations" and characterized the tribes' relationship to the
United States as resembling "that of a ward to his guardian."33 Thus,
Cherokee Nation established the "trust" relationship that would later
serve as the basis for the plenary powers of Congress and the perma-
nent subjection of tribal sovereignty to the whim of federal
authority.34
In the third case, Worcester v. Georgia,35 Justice Marshall defined
the relationship between the Indian Nations and the individual states.
This case involved the conviction of four missionaries who had resided
on Cherokee land in violation of Georgia law.36 The Court ruled that
the laws under which the missionaries had been convicted were un-
28 MTntosh, 21 U.S. at 574.
29 M'Intosh demonstrates that, even at this early point in time, the consent of the
tribal nations was no longer a concern of the Court. Marshall made it quite clear that the
tribes were subordinate to the United States government.
30 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
31 Id. at 15. Two of the acts passed by the State of Georgia were: "an act to add the
territory lying within this state and occupied by the Cherokee Indians, to the counties of
Carroll, De Kalb, Gwinett, Hall, and Habersham, and to extend the laws of this state over
the same, and for other purposes," and "an act to... annul all laws and ordinances made
by the Cherokee nation of Indians, and to provide for the compensation of officers serving
legal processes in said territory, and to regulate the testimony of Indians." Id. Other acts
involved the surveying and settling of Cherokee lands. Id. at 13.
32 Id. at 20. The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over cases in which a "State"
is a party. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. Note that "State" is used here in its international
sense.
33 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17, 18.
34 DELORIA & LYrLE, supra note 21, at 30 ("Marshall's views in this case established the
foundation upon which much of the idea of federal responsibility over Indian affairs is
built.").
35 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
36 Georgia prosecuted the missionaries under a law that it passed on December 22,
1830, entitled:
An act of [sic] prevent the exercise of assumed and arbitrary power, by all
persons, under pretext of authority from the Cherokee Indians and their
laws, and to prevent white persons from residing within that part of the
chartered limits of Georgia, occupied by the Cherokee Indians, and to pro-
vide a guard for the protection of the gold mines, and to enforce the laws




constitutional.37 In this decision, Justice Marshall reinstated some of
the political independence that he stripped away in Cherokee Nation.
Setting the relationship between the tribes and the individual states
on a base of political independence, Marshall provided some of the
definition necessary for sovereignty.38 "The Cherokee nation, then, is
a distinct community occupying its own territory, with boundaries ac-
curately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force
"39
The three Marshall cases established the basic principles of fed-
eral Indian law. The "domestic dependent nation" status of the In-
dian tribes indicated that they were under the protection of the
federal government and, consequently, lacked sufficient sovereign au-
thority for complete political independence. They did possess, how-
ever, sufficient sovereignty to exclude state incursions into their
internal affairs. 40 This internal-external dichotomy might have of-
fered an adequate definition of the tribal-federal-state relationship if
there had been some assurance that the tribes would continue to exist
as sovereign entities within the federal system.41 Events soon fol-
lowed, however, that made it quite clear that no such assurance exis-
ted and that the relationship, as defined by the Marshall decisions, was
not set in stone.
2. Removal and Assimilation
In practice, the Marshall cases offered very little protection for
the remaining sovereign rights of the Indian Nations.42 The clamor
created by the settlers, who wanted more land, was too great for the
federal government to ignore. President Jackson urged voluntary re-
moval of the tribes to a point beyond the Mississippi river.43 On May
28, 1830, Congress heeded Jackson's suggestion and passed the In-
dian Removal Act,44 authorizing voluntary removal of the tribes. Vol-
untary removal was not expeditious however, and Jackson used the
military to hasten the process.45 Nevertheless, removal only post-
poned the problem. Further westward expansion eventually filled the
37 Id. at 561.
38 This equality was, however, limited to tribal relations with the states. The federal
government still dominated in its relationship with the tribes.
39 Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561.
40 DELORIA & LyrLE, supra note 21, at 33.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 6-7.
44 Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 174
(1988)).
45 Deborah J. Borrero, Note, They Never Kept But One Promise-County of Yakima v.
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. 683, 67 WASH. L.
REv. 937, 937-38 (1992).
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open spaces of the west, once again bringing the non-Indians into
conflict with the tribes.
46
As federal Indian policy merged with Manifest Destiny,47 it be-
came far less practical to deal with the Indian Nations as separate pow-
ers.48 The Plains tribes refused to cede more territory for white
settlement and called upon the United States to fulfill its treaty com-
mitments.49 In 1871 Congress, in an attempt to increase its power
over Indian affairs, ended treaty-making with tribes,50 and by the late
1870s shifted the focus of federal Indian policy toward assimilation.
5 1
The greatest expression of this desire to bring the Indian into the
mainstream of white culture was the Indian General Allotment Act of
1887, also known as the Dawes Act.52 The purpose of the Dawes Act
was to break up the tribal system and transform the Indians into farm-
ers, that being the quickest route to assimilation.53 The Act provided
for the division of reservation land into individual allotments that the
government granted to individuals in trust for 25 years.54 At the end
of that period, the trust converted to ownership in fee and the land
and the Indian became subject to all federal and state laws.55 The Act
also provided for the purchase of "surplus" reservation lands by non-
Indians settlers.5 6
The Dawes Act and the assimilationist policies of the federal gov-
ernment were disastrous for Indian peoples. They also failed to make
46 DELORIA & LyrL-, supra note 21.
47 Journalist John L. O'Sullivan captured the spirit of westward expansion when he
wrote in 1845 that nothing must interfere with "the fulfillment of our manifest destiny to
overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our yearly
multiplying millions." JOHN A. GARRArv, THE AMERICAN NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 286 (Sd ed. 1975) (emphasis in original).
48 DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 111 (2d ed.
1986).
49 O'Brien, supra note 24, at 1465.
50 Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (1871) (codified in part at 25
U.S.C. § 71 (1988)).
51 O'Brien, supra note 24, at 1465.
52 Indian General Allotment Act of 1887 (Dawes Act), ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified
as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-334, 336, 339, 341-342, 348-349, 381 (1988)).
53 DELORIA & LYrLE, supra note 21, at 8-9; Johnson, supra note 4, at 651; O'Brien,
supra note 24, at 1465. For an interesting look at official thought on the reservation and
allotment policies, see the reports of the commissioners of Indian Affairs in FRANCIS P.
PRUCHA, DOCUMENTS OF UNrrED STATES INDIAN PoLIcy 77-80, 92-94, 123-26 (2d ed. 1990).
54 Dawes Act, 24 Stat. 389. See also County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and
Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. 683, 686 (1992) (holding that the Indian
General Allotment Act of 1887 permitted the county to impose an ad valorem tax on reser-
vation land patented in fee pursuant to the Act).
55 Dawes Act, 24 Stat. 389-90; Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 686.
56 Dawes Act, 24 Stat. 389-90; Johnson, supra note 4, at 651. This provision for the sale
of "surplus" land advanced the assimilationist purposes of the Dawes Act by accelerating




the Indians "productive American citizens" in the eyes of the govern-
ment.5 7 The end of the allotment era saw approximately two thirds of
Indian lands converted to non-Indian ownership58 and very little pro-
gress towards the assimilation of Indians into United States culture.
3. Self-Government and Reorganization
Federal Indian policy shifted from assimilation to self-govern-
ment when Congress enacted the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) in
1934.59 The IRA ended the allotment policies and attempted to rem-
edy some of the damage they had caused.60 The Act offered tribes the
opportunity to restructure their governments according to models
created by the federal government.61 The purpose of the IRA was to
restore some of the self-government and tribal sovereignty that the
Dawes Act had destroyed and to place tribal members under the con-
trol of tribal governments rather than the federal Indian bureau-
cracy.62 Almost all aspects of the reorganization program, however,
required the approval of the Secretary of the Department of the Inte-
rior.63 Thus, the IRA did not vest the tribal governments with true
sovereign powers, but merely offered a limited level of self-govern-
ment through the delegation of federal authority.6 The IRA offered
some level of self-government, yet it denied the authority necessary for
tribal sovereignty. Consequently, the shift away from the policies of
the Dawes Act was merely cosmetic.
4. Termination
After World War II, federal Indian policy underwent another
shift. The policies underlying the IRA fell into disfavor and "Indian
'emancipation' and freedom was again to be achieved through legisla-
tion promoting the integration of Indian individuals into the Ameri-
57 SeeJohnson, supra note 4, at 650-51. See also Borrero, supra note 45, at 943 (noting
that the allotment programs "devastated Indian Country" and that Native Americans never
became successful farmers); Andr6e Lawrey, Contemporay Efforts to Guarantee Indigenous
Rights Under International Law, 23 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 703, 715-16 (1990) (pointing out
that government policies involving forced assimilation generally have disastrous conse-
quences for indigenous peoples).
58 DELORIA & Lyric, supra note 21, at 10; Johnson, supra note 4, at 651.
59 The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1988)).
60 See CANBY, supra note 19, at 23-24 (noting that the IRA enabled the return of some
former tribal lands to the tribes and the creation of new reservations); O'Brien, supra note
24, at 1466 (similarly outlining the provisions of the IRA).
61 CANBY, supra note 19, at 24.
62 See DELORIA & LyrsL, supra note 21, at 14 (describing the aims of the IRA).
63 See Vine Deloria, Jr., Laws Founded injustice and Humanity: Reflections on the Content
and Character of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIz. L. REv. 203, 206 (1989) (discussing the ineffec-
tiveness of the IRA with respect to re-establishing tribal sovereignty).
64 Id. at 213-14.
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can mainstream."65 In 1953 Congress passed House Concurrent
Resolution 108, declaring that it was
the sense of Congress that, at the earliest possible time, all of the
Indian tribes and the individual members thereof located within the
States of California, Florida, New York, and Texas, [and the mem-
bers of other named tribes] should be freed from Federal supervi-
sion and control and from all disabilities and limitations specially
applicable to Indians.
66
This statement spurred the passage of thirteen separate acts of termi-
nation, affecting 109 tribes and bands.67 By severing all tribal-federal
relations, the termination acts left the members of the affected tribes
under the control of the states in which they were located. Thus, ter-
mination effectively eliminated tribal sovereignty. 68
5. Self-Determination
The policies of the federal government shifted again in the
1970's, returning to the concepts of self-government and self-determi-
nation. In 1970 President Nixon issued a statement to Congress set-
ting forth the current direction of federal Indian policy.69 He called
upon Congress to repudiate the termination policy and to follow a
program of legislation aimed at maximizing Indian autonomy.70 One
representative measure of this latest period is the Indian Self-Determi-
nation and Education Assistance Act of 1975.71 The purpose of the
Act is to allow tribes to contract with the government in order to take
over the operation of programs on their reservations with minimum
outside control.72 This era of self-determination represents the most
recent trend in federal Indian policy. It remains to be seen, however,
if it will be the last.
73
65 O'Brien, supra note 24, at 1466.
66 H.R. CON. RES. 108, 67 Stat. B132 (1953).
67 O'Brien, supra note 24, at 1466-67. See also United States v. Burland, 441 F.2d 1199,
1202 n.4 (9th Cir.) (listing termination statutes), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 842 (1971).
68 See DELORIA & Lyru, supra note 21, at 20. Congress also passed Public Law 280 in
1953. This statute extended civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian tribes in five states.
See Pub. L. No. 280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28
U.S.C. § 1360 (1988)).
69 See H.R. Doc. No. 363, 91st Cong., 116 CONG. Rlc. S23,258-62 (daily ed. July 8,
1970) ("Proposed Recommendations Relating to the American Indians Message from the
President").
70 Id.
71 25 U.S.C. § 450 (1988), amended &y Pub. L. Nos. 301, 644 (1990).
72 O'Brien, supra note 24, at 1467.
73 See CANBY, supra note 19, at 31 (cautioning against the conclusion that the state of
Indian affairs will not change in the future, especially given the history of oscillating fed-
eral policies toward Indians).
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B. Conflicts of Sovereignty
The fluctuations evident throughout the history of federal Indian
policy-making are the results of an ill-defined tribal-federal relation-
ship. Because of the absolute nature of sovereignty, the existence of
multiple sovereign authorities within the same territory creates, in the
absence of dispute resolution mechanisms capable of preserving the
authority of all concerned parties, an unstable relationship.74 This in-
stability results in the erosion of the weaker nation's sovereign author-
ity. Unless the tribes and the federal government develop a mutually
defined relationship that ensures the security of interests vital to both
sides, these conflicts will continue to erode the sovereign base of the
Indian tribes.
The nature of the United States' interests tends to be territorial.
It is generally accepted that " [ t]he legal competence of states and the
rules for their protection depend on and assume the existence of a stable,
physically delimited, homeland."75 The federal government cannot allow
a foreign power to operate unrestrained within its territorial borders.
Such a situation jeopardizes the stability of the nation and threatens
the safety of its people. Therefore, the federal government attempts
to limit the sovereign power of the tribes.75 In United States v.
Kagama,77 the Court described this state of affairs by remarking that
Indians are wiihin the geographical limits of the United States. The
soil and the people within these limits are under the political con-
trol of the Government of the United States, or of the States of the
74 Thomas Hobbes discussed the absolute nature of sovereignty in Leviathan. After
listing all of the necessary rights of a sovereign, he stated that "[t]hese are the rights which
make the essence of sovereignty, and which are the marks whereby a man may discern in
what man or assembly of men the sovereign power is placed and resides. For these are incom-
municable and inseparable." THOMAS HOBBES, LEvrATHAN 150 (Oskar Piest ed., 1958) (em-
phasis added). Among the rights that Hobbes enumerated are those which this Note
discusses in reference to the example cases: "Seventhly is annexed to the sovereignty the
whole power of prescribing the rules" (legislature); "Eighthly is annexed to the sovereignty
the right ofjudicature-that is to say, of hearing and deciding all controversies" (criminal
and civil jurisdiction); "and to levy money upon the subjects" (taxation). Id. at 148-49 (em-
phasis added).
Chief Justice John Marshall acknowledged the absolute nature of sovereignty in The
Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch.) 116 (1812) (involving the peacetime
jurisdiction of United States courts over a French warship). Marshall stated that "[t]he
jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is
susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself." Id. at 136.
75 IAN BROWNE, PRINciPLEs OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 109 (3d ed. 1979) (em-
phasis added). See also CRAWFoRD, supra note 27, at 36 ("the right to be a State is depen-
dent at least in the first instance upon the exercise of full governmental powers with
respect to some area of territory.").
76 This territorial integrity argument does not enjoy unanimous support. See, e.g., Mc-
Coy, supra note 19, at 391-92 (rejecting the argument that awarding special rights to Indian
tribes threatens the territorial integrity of the United States).
77 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
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Union. There exist within the broad domain of sovereignty but
these two. There may be cities, counties, and other organized bod-
ies with limited legislative functions, but they... exist in subordina-
tion to one or the other of these.
78
Any mutually defined system must take into account each party's terri-
torial interests. The current system, however, recognizes the interests
of the United States, but denies such recognition of tribal interests.
Thus, until the parties devise a mutually acceptable approach, these
sovereignty conflicts will continue to erode tribal sovereignty because
the more powerful sovereign will not sacrifice its vital interests.79 The
following case discussions offer concrete examples of this problem.8 0
C. Erosion of Tribal Sovereignty: Three Examples
The following three cases offer good examples of common areas
of conflict between Indian tribes and the United States government:
legislative authority of Congress, criminal jurisdiction, and taxation.
Each of these cases involves the collision of sovereign powers. In all
three instances, the sovereign base of the weaker entity, the Indian
tribe, was "necessarily diminished."8 1 The real danger to the Indian
Nations is not that these conflicts of sovereignty exist, for they are
inevitable, but rather that there is no mutually defined system for
dealing with conflicts when they arise. Vine Deloria described this
lack of definition as follows:
[w] e are told that federal Indian law can be understood as the trac-
ing of the flow of power from and between various governments.
But, we have no understanding of the nature of these governments,
78 Id. at 379.
79 It is accepted in international law that "a State may continue to be sovereign even
though important governmental functions are carried out, by treaty or otherwise, by an-
other State." CRAXwo.D, supra note 27, at 27. However, in practice, only the weaker sover-
eign will assign these functions to another state. Interestingly, in the tribal-federal
relationship the United States assumed governmental functions on behalf of the tribes,
without the tribes ever affirmatively assigning these functions.
80 The discussion in this Note focuses on the tribal-federal relationship. The majority
of the conflicts that threaten tribal sovereignty, however, arise out of the tribal-state rela-
tionship. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (conflict over tribal regu-
lation of hunting and fishing within the reservation); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and
Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989) (conflict over authority to zone
land within reservation boundaries). These cases resulted from undefined tribal-state rela-
tionships in situations where the sovereign authority of those entities conflicted. On an
individual basis, the definition of the relationship between the states and the tribes would
seem to be of greater import than the definition of federal relations. A properly defined
federal-tribal relationship, however, would limit state authority over the tribes to cases
where the tribes had specifically compacted with the state and agreed to surrender rights
to the state government. Thus, the federal-tribal relationship is the foundation upon
which improved tribal-state relations should be built.
81 M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574.
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no idea how they originate, what powers they possess, and what
their previous relations have been.8 2
Thus, the only certainty in the current system is that the powerful en-
tity will be able to protect its rights and the weaker entity will suffer.
83
1. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock: Treaties v. the Plenary Power of
Congress
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock 4 has been called the "Indians' Dred Scott
decision."8 5 In that case, the Court held that treaty provisions cannot
limit Congress' power to legislate with respect to the Indians8 6 and
that "[tlhe power exists to abrogate the provisions of an Indian
treaty."87 This determination greatly limited the effectiveness of
agreements between the tribes and the federal government.88 The
authority to make agreements with other nations is one of the primary
powers of a sovereign nation; without such powers, sovereignty is a
hollow concept.
The controversy in Lone Wolf centered around two treaties be-
tween the United States and the Kiowa and Comanche tribes. The
first treaty, the Medicine Lodge treaty, went into effect in 1867 and
.established a reservation for the two tribes.8 9 The two pertinent provi-
sions of this treaty are the Sixth and Twelfth articles. The Sixth Arti-
cle of the treaty provided for allotment of lands in fee to heads of
families.90 The Twelfth Article stated that:
No treaty for the cession of any portion or part of the reservation
herein described, which may be held in common, shall be of any
validity or force as against the said Indians, unless executed and
82 Deloria, supra note 63, at 213.
83 The discussion of each of these cases assumes that the tribes have at least the level
of sovereignty established by the Marshall cases. With that assumption, the analysis focuses
on the effect of these decisions upon the tribes' limited sovereign authority. It will become
apparent, however, that given the overriding power of Congress, and the tendency of the
Court to protect federal and state interests at the expense of tribal interests, even the as-
sumption of that limited level of sovereignty is questionable.
84 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
85 Matthew D. Wells, Comment, Sparrow and Lone Wolf. Honoring Tribal Rights In
Canada and the United States, 66 WASH. L. Ray. 1119 (1991) (calling for legislation to explic-
itly overrule the tenets of Lone Wolf and to follow Canadian practices with respect to the
"trust" responsibility).
86 187 U.S. at 564.
87 Id. at 566.
88 See Sioux Nation of Indians v. United States, 601 F.2d 1157, 1173 (Ct. Cl. 1979)
(NicholsJ, concurring) (Lone Wolf indicated that the tribes had "no rights by treaty which
the Congress was bound to respect"), af'd, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).




signed by at least three fourths of all the adult male Indians occupy-
ing the same .... 91
On October 6, 1892, 456 adult male members of the confeder-
ated tribes signed a second agreement regarding a proposed treaty
between the United States and the tribes.92 This agreement provided
that the tribes surrender to the United States all rights in the reserva-
tion in exchange for allotments of land to the Indians in severalty.93
Individual tribal members would gain fee simple title to their prospec-
tive allotment after a twenty-five year period.94 In addition, the pro-
posed treaty provided that the United States pay the tribes $2,000,000
for their surplus lands.9 5
The agreement went to Congress, and after several amendments
Congress approved it on January 19, 1900.96 On June 6, 1901, the
tribes filed suit to enjoin the Government from enacting the legisla-
tion. Generally, the tribes argued that the legislation violated the
Constitution by denying them the use of their land without due pro-
cess.97 Specifically, the Indians claimed that the Government pro-
cured the agreement through fraud, that three fourths of the male
adult members of the tribe did not sign the agreement, and that Con-
gress changed portions of the signed agreement without tribal
consent.
98
The Court held in favor of the Government, basing its decision
on the "relation of dependency" of the Indian tribes.99 Congress' au-
thority to change the agreement was rooted in its responsibility to pro-
tect the Indians. 100 The Court noted that the tribes' contention that
they had a vested property interest granted by treaty "ignores the sta-
tus of the contracting Indians and the relation of dependency they
bore and continue to bear towards the government of the United
States."101 Moreover, it determined that Congress' authority over the
tribes is a political concern and is not subject to judicial control. 0 2
Thus, the Court clearly demonstrated that Congressional authority is
91 Id.
92 The Indian agent present at the signing represented that there were 562 adult
males in the three tribes. Id. at 554. According to the Secretary of the Interior, however,
there were 725 males over the age of eighteen, and 639 over the age of twenty-one. Id. at
557.
93 187 U.S. at 555.
94 See the discussion of the Dawes Act, supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
95 Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 555.
96 Id. at 556-59. Further amendments were made after passage. Id. at 560.
97 Id. at 560-61.
98 Id. at 561.
99 Id. at 564.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 565.
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unlimited when questions arise that affect the lands and people within
the territorial borders of the United States. Quoting from an earlier
case that established complete Congressional authority over the Indi-
ans, the Court reinforced both the dependence notion and the deci-
sive issue of territoriality:
The power of the general government over these remnants of a race
once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary
to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom
they dwell. It must exist in that government, because it never has
existed anywhere else, because the theatre of its exercise is within the geo-
graphical limits of the United States .... 103
By protecting the sovereign interests of the United States in Lone Wolf,
the Court further diminished the already eroding sovereignty of the
Indian Nations.
2. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe: The Question of Tribal
Criminal Jurisdiction over Non-Indians
While the ability to make binding treaties is a fundamental aspect
of sovereignty, the issue addressed in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe'0 4 is arguably more central to Indian sovereignty concerns. In
Oliphant, the Court considered whether an Indian tribe retains crimi-
nal jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit crimes on the tribe's
reservation.' 05 This issue cuts to the core of the concept of sover-
eignty. The sovereign's right to promote and enforce order within its
territorial borders is a central feature of sovereignty. 10 6 In his dissent,
Justice Thurgood Marshall stated that the "power to preserve order on
the reservation... is a sine qua non of the sovereignty that the Su-
quamish originally possessed."1 07 It also represents a strong point of
conflict between a tribe's interests in maintaining order and peace
and the United States' interest in protecting its citizens' rights.
The petitioners in Oliphant were charged with criminal conduct
under the Tribal Code,'08 arraigned, and then released. Both peti-
tioners filed for writs of habeas corpus to the United States District
Court for the Western District of Washington, alleging that the Tribal
Court did not have jurisdiction over non-Indians. 10 9 The district court
103 Id. at 567 (quoting United States v. Kagaina, 118 U.S. 375 (1886)) (emphasis
added).
104 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
105 Id. at 195.
106 HOBBES, supra note 74, at 148.
107 435 U.S. at 212 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
108 Id. at 194. The tribe charged petitioner Oliphant with assaulting a tribal officer
and resisting arrest, and petitioner Belgarde with "recklessly endangering another person
and injuring tribal property." Id. (quoting tribal court).
109 Id. at 194.
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denied both petitions.110 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed,
stating that Indian tribes, "though conquered and dependent, retain
those powers of autonomous states that are neither inconsistent with
their status nor expressly terminated by Congress.""'
In an opinion written by Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court
reversed, holding that Indian tribes do not retain criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians. 1 2 In support of the holding, Rehnquist discussed
various treaty provisions" 3 and argued that the history of Indian trea-
ties demonstrates that Indian tribes never retained the authority to try
non-Indians. Justice Rehnquist opined that:
The earliest treaties typically expressly provided that 'any citizen of
the United States, who shall do an injury to any Indian of the [tribal]
nation, or to any other Indian or Indians residing in their towns,
and under their protection, shall be punished according to the laws
of the United States.' While ... these provisions were not necessary
to remove criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians from the Indian
tribes, they would naturally have served an important function in
the developing stage of United States-Indian relations by clarifying
jurisdictional limits of the Indian tribes."
4
Justice Rehnquist further argued that Congress always intended
to deny such jurisdictional authority to the Indians."15 He pointed to
the Trade and Intercourse Act" 6 of 1790 and the Major Crimes Act"
1
of 1885, both of which transferred jurisdiction over certain classes of
crimes from Indian tribes to the federal courts, as evidence that Con-
gress followed an "unspoken assumption" that such jurisdiction was
not within the power of tribal courts.118 He stated that "[w]hile Con-
gress never expressly forbade Indian tribes to impose criminal penal-
ties on non-Indians, we now make express our implicit conclusion...
that Congress consistently believed this to be the necessary result of its
repeated legislative actions."" 9
Justice Rehnquist further justified the Court's holding by quoting
from Ex parte Crow Dog.
120
110 Id. at 194-95.
111 Id. at 196 (quoting Oliphantv. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 1976)). Note
again that the authority of the tribes is qualified even as it is being upheld.
112 Id. at 195.
113 Id. at 197-203.
114 Id. at 198 n.8 (citation omitted) (brackets in original). The language quoted by the
Court here is very similar to choice of law clauses in modem international agreements.
115 Id. at 203.
116 Ch. 38, sec. 5, 1 Stat. 137 (1790).
117 Ch. 341, sec. 9, 23 Stat. 385 (1885) (codified, as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153
(1988)).
118 Oliphan4 435 U.S. at 201-03.
119 Id. at 204.
120 Id. at 210.
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[In Crow Dog,] [t]he United States was seeking to extend United
States "law, by argument and inference only, ... over aliens and
strangers; over the members of a community separated by race [and]
tradition, ... from the authority and power which seeks to impose
upon them the restraints of an external and unknown code... ;
which judges them by a standard made by others and not for them
.... It tries them, not by their peers, nor by the customs of their
peoples, nor the law of their land, but by... a different race, ac-
cording to the law of a social state of which they have an imperfect
conception .... 1
2 1
Crow Dog answered a question related to that of Oliphant-whether
federal courts could exercise jurisdiction over an Indian who had
killed another Indian while on reservation land.122 Rehnquist as-
serted that the considerations in Crow Dog, which required that the
Court deny jurisdiction to the federal courts, applied just as strongly
when applied to non-Indian offenders in tribal courts.'
23
The Court's reasoning reveals a concern that a non-Indian would
not receive justice in an Indian court. Regardless of the validity of this
concern, using it as a reason to deny jurisdiction is strange in compari-
son to concerns that arise in analogous international law situations. It
is extremely unlikely that a foreign nation would accept such an argu-
ment as the basis of a United States decision to deny the foreign na-
tion's jurisdiction over an American citizen who committed a crime
within the foreign nation's borders. The Court accepted this argu-
ment in Crow Dog only because the United States attempted to take
jurisdiction over a matter completely internal to the tribal nation.
Granting the United States jurisdiction in Crow Dog would have been
analogous to granting the United Kingdom jurisdiction over the mur-
der of a United States citizen committed by a United States citizen
within the territorial boundaries of the United States. The United
States government would never grant the United Kingdom such juris-
diction. Although this argument may be valid in the context of juris-
dictional invasions, in Oliphant the argument is strained because the
crime was committed within the borders of the tribe's reservation.
The conflict in Oliphant pitted the interest of the United States
government in protecting its citizens against the equally important
right of the tribe to deal with events within its own territory in
whatever manner it deems appropriate. Once again, in battles over
121 Id. at210-11 (quotingExparteCrowDog, 109 U.S. 556,571 (1883)) (superseded by
the Major Crimes Act as stated in United States v. Blue, 722 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1993)).
122 Id. at 210.
123 The passage of the Major Crimes Act was a direct result of this case. Congress did
not consider the tribal punishment of the offender to be adequate and was outraged that
such a crime could go "unpunished." CANBY, supra note 19, at 105. Thus, while the case
upheld tribal jurisdiction, it actually resulted in the erosion of tribal sovereignty by mobiliz-
ing Congress to limit the jurisdictional authority of the Indian tribes.
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matters of sovereignty, the weaker sovereign lost regardless of the
equities.
3. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian
Reservation: The Power of a State to Impose Taxes On
Reservation Activities
The authority to levy taxes is a critical power for any sovereign
nation. Governments require large sums of money to operate. Thus,
a tribal government, like any other government, will fail if it cannot
raise enough revenue to enable it to exercise its sovereign powers and
provide governmental programs and services for its citizens. In Wash-
ington v. Confederated Tibes of the Colville Indian Reservation124 the Court
addressed this critical taxation issue. Justice John Marshall's observa-
tion in McCulloch v. Maryland 25 that "the power to tax involves the
power to destroy" 126 holds true in this case. The issue in Colville was
whether the tribes could prevent the State of Washington from taxing
on-reservation consumer sales to nonmembers of the tribes.' 27 The
Court held that the State could impose such taxes. 128
The State of Washington levied a cigarette excise tax of $1.60 per
carton. 129 This tax applied to the "sale, use, consumption, handling,
possession or distribution" of cigarettes within the State.130 Enforce-
ment was implemented through tax stamps, but Indian tribes were
allowed to possess unstamped cigarettes intended for resale to mem-
bers of the tribes.' 31 The State of Washington maintained that it was
entitled to collect taxes on all cigarettes sold to non-Indians on the
reservation and sought to enforce its tax by seizing cigarettes bound
for the reservation.'3 2
The tribes levied a much smaller tax on the cigarettes than did
the State of Washington. 33 Indeed, the cigarettes sold on Indian res-
ervations were a dollar less per carton than those sold off the reserva-
tions.' 34 As a result, Indian tobacco dealers sold the majority of their
124 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
125 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
126 Id. at 431.
127 Colvile 447 U.S. at 138.
128 Id. at 160. Although this case dealt with several issues of taxation, for purposes of
this Note, discussion of only the first is sufficient. Id. at 140-41 (listing the other taxation
issues in this case).
129 Id. at 141.
130 Id. (quoting WASH. Rav. CODE § 82.24.020 (1976)).
131 Id. The tribes were required to collect the tax on sales to nonmembers. WAsH.
R-v. CODE § 82.24.260 (1976).
132 Colville 447 U.S. at 142.
133 The Colville, Lummi, and Makah Tribes levied a tax of 40 to 50 cents per carton,
while the Yakima Tribe levied a tax of 22.5 cents per carton. Id. at 144-45.
134 Id. at 145.
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cigarettes to residents of nearby communities who travelled to the res-
ervation for the savings.'3 5 If the State of Washington could not levy
its tax on those sales, it would lose significant tax revenues.' 3 6 All par-
ties agreed that if the State were able to eliminate the one dollar dif-
ferential, the Indians' business would fall off drastically.
137
The tribes argued that because of the severe economic impact
that state taxation would have on the tribes, federal statutes regulating
Indian affairs pre-empted the state from levying such taxes.' 38 They
also argued that the taxes were inconsistent with the principle of tribal
self-government and invalid under "negative implications" of the In-
dian Commerce Clause.'3 9 In its analysis, the Court first observed that
"[t]he power to tax... is a fundamental attribute of sovereignty which
the tribes retain unless divested of it by federal law or necessary impli-
cation of their dependent status."140 It then dismissed the Indians'
pre-emption argument because the reservation smokeshops offered
"solely an exemption from state taxation." 141 No federal statute, the
Court held, "goes so far as to grant tribal enterprises selling goods to
nonmembers an artificial competitive advantage over all other busi-
nesses in a State."' 42
The Court also dismissed the Indians' other two arguments. With
respect to the principle of self-government, the Court noted that the
State of Washington did not interfere with the right of the Indians to
" 'make their own laws and be ruled by them' ... merely because the
result... will be to deprive the Tribes of revenues which they cur-
rently are receiving."' 43 It went on to explain that "[t] he principle of
tribal self-government, grounded in notions of inherent sovereignty
and in congressional policies, seeks an accommodation between the
interests of the Tribes and the Federal Government, on the one hand,
and those of the State, on the other."' This statement exemplifies
the balancing approach employed by the Court to resolve conflicts of
interest between a State and an Indian tribe. Applying the balancing
test, the Court held in favor of the State of Washington. 145 Finally, the
135 Id.
136 "From 1972 through 1976, the Colville Tribe realized approximately $266,000 from
its cigarette tax; the Lummi Tribe realized $54,000 and the Makah Tribe realized
$13,000.... In 1975, the Yakima Tribe derived $278,000 from its cigarette business." Id. at
144.
137 Id. at 145.
138 Id. at 154.
'39 Id.
140 Id. at 152.
141 Id. at 155.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 156.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 157. It is doubtful whether a tribe could ever be victorious in a United States
court that employed a balancing approach.
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Court observed that the Indian Commerce Clause did not apply be-
cause the potential loss of Indian commerce existed only because the
tribes ignored the disputed tax in the first place.146 Therefore, the
Court concluded that the State of Washington could legitimately im-
pose its cigarette excise tax on sales made to non-Indians on reserva-
tion land.
147
The Court analyzed this case entirely from the point of view of
the purchaser, considering solely whether or not he or she could be
taxed by the State. While it recognized that the power to tax is an
inherent sovereign power, 148 the Court failed to recognize the signifi-
cance that this fact held for tribal sovereignty. The relevant issue was
not whether the non-Indian should have to pay taxes on cigarettes,
but whether one sovereign can legitimately force the levying of a tax
on purchases made within the territory of another sovereign entity.
The imposition of such an obligation is inappropriate. 149 By uphold-
ing Washington State's tax on the reservation, the Court eviscerated
one of the core tribal sovereign powers, and further diminished the
sovereignty of Indian tribes. 150
II
THE ILLUSION OF TRIBAL SOvEREIGNTY
The outcomes of Lone Wolf, Oliphant, and Colville, reveal that the
current state of the law does not protect tribal sovereignty. In decid-
ing these cases, the Court balanced the interests of the tribes, the state
and the federal government. This calculus invariably results in the
tribal interests losing out to the interests of the state and federal gov-
146 Id.
147 Id. at 159.
148 Id. at 152.
149 The imposition of the State of Washington's tax in this case would be similar to the
government of Mexico forcing the collection of a tax on items sold to Mexican citizens
within the borders of the United States. While it is surely within the authority of the Mexi-
can government to impose a tax upon the Mexican citizens when they re-enter Mexico, it
has no authority to order an official or citizen of the United States to collect the same tax.
Such an extraterritorial application of laws would not be appropriate between sovereigns
in international relations, and, by analogy, should not be appropriate in this case.
150 The Court argued that imposing the tax would not hurt a tribe's ability to govern
itself because it was still free to impose its own tax. This freedom is irrelevant because the
tribe's sovereignty has been invaded regardless of whether it can still impose a tax. Never-
theless, the imposition of the tax did threaten the ability of the tribes to govern themselves
because any additional tax imposed by them would price them out of the market. Thus, it
is absurd for the Court to argue that "each government is free to impose its taxes without
ousting the other." 447 U.S. at 158. If a tribe places its tax on the cigarettes, in addition to
the state-imposed tax, then non-Indian buyers will stop purchasing cigarettes on the reser-
vation, and the State of Washington will gain the artificial advantage that it complained the
Indians had. A relevant question then becomes: Can the Reservation force the State of




ernments. This conclusion is supported by the fact that Indian sover-
eignty currently holds a weak position in the "courts of the
conquerors."151 Writing for the majority in County of Yakima v. Confed-
erated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, Justice Scalia noted
that "[ t]he 'platonic notions of Indian sovereignty' that guided Chief
Justice Marshall have, over time, lost their independent sway."
152
Thus, even the limited notions of sovereignty expounded in the Mar-
shall cases are no longer viable in the context of tribal-federal and
tribal-state relationships.
53
There are two arguments commonly used to defend the current
relationship between Indian tribes and the United States. The first is
the familiar "trust" doctrine originally developed in the Cherokee Cases.
This argument espouses the view that a sovereign entity does not cease
to exist simply because it delegates certain aspects of its sovereign au-
thority to another sovereign power. 54  As Justice John Marshall
stressed in Worcester, "the settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that
a weaker power does not surrender its independence-its right to self
government, by associating with a stronger, and taking its protec-
tion."' 55 The thrust of the argument is that the Indian tribes have
delegated a necessary portion of tribal sovereignty to the federal gov-
ernment, but that they still posses inherent sovereign rights. Chapters
XI and XII of the United Nations Charter, which establish a "trust"
system for non-self-governing territories, provide support for this
position. 15
6
Acceptance of the "trust" relationship ignores the fact that the
Indian tribes have not willingly delegated their sovereign authority to
the degree that is normally assumed. The United States government
simply seized control over the tribes. 157 Moreover, it is quite clear that
151 M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 588.
152 112 S. Ct. 683, 687 (1992) (quoting McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411
U.S. 164, 172 (1973)) (holding that the Indian General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887
permits the County to impose an ad valorem tax on reservation land patented in fee, but
does not permit the Country to enforce its excise tax on sales of such land). Note that this
holding draws upon the authority of the Dawes Act, the policies of which were supposedly
no longer followed by the federal government. In doing so, the Court "rejuvenated the
repudiated political policies of removal and assimilation." Borrero, supra note 45, at 938.
153 See supra notes 25-40 and accompanying text.
154 CRAwFoRD, supra note 27, at 188; BROWNLE, supra note 75, at 77; McCoy, supra note
19, at 363.
155 31 U.S. at 560-61.
156 See U.N. CHARTER arts. 73-85 (defining the trusteeship system).
157 The many treaties signed with various tribes usually included delegation of tribal
sovereignty. Quite often, however, these treaties were the result of fraud and duress. Peter
Nabakov provides the following account:
To the Indians the practice of drafting a written agreement to settle
political and territorial disputes was alien and unfamiliar, and as a result, it
was used against them to great advantage. As Red Cloud, the Oglala Sioux
leader, recalled, "In 1868 men came out and brought papers. We could not
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the "trust" relationship between the federal government and the In-
dian tribes offers little, if any, protection for tribal sovereignty. One
commentator noted that
[a]s a direct consequence of European colonial expansion, indige-
nous peoples have been deprived of their independence, their land,
and their right to choose their role in the modern state. They are at
the mercy of governments that may claim to have their best interests
at heart, but have been singularly unsuccessful at promoting or pro-
tecting those interests. After centuries of "enlightened" govern-
ment policies, indigenous peoples are still among the most severely
disadvantaged groups in their states. As a result, indigenous people
doubt that national governments have the ability or the desire to
provide a better future.'5 8
Thus, given the "trust" doctrine's track record, can it really be viewed
as a guardian of tribal rights?
The second argument depends upon the assertion that sovereign
authority is not necessarily absolute. Under this assertion, two sover-
eigns can share authority over the same subjects by dividing their re-
spective jurisdictions. Thus, tribal governments and the federal
government each have authority in separate areas; the tribal govern-
ment over internal affairs, and the federal government over external
ones. In his article The Limits of Sovereignty, A. Lawrence Lowell de-
scribes the nature of this "dual sovereignty":
Now, definite limits may be set to sovereign power in either one of
two ways. They may result from the rivalry of two independent rul-
ers, which settle by negotiation questions concerning the bounda-
ries of their respective jurisdictions... or they may be established
by some formal declaration, which by sufficient precision enables
the bulk of the society to have a general opinion about the extent of
legislative authority, and to distinguish between those commands
which fall within the boundaries prescribed and those which do not.
... It may not, perhaps, be always easy in such cases to define
accurately the boundaries of each ruler's authority; but this diffi-
culty ... does not affect the proposition that two sovereigns with
different spheres of activity may govern the same subjects.' 59
This approach explains the internal/external dichotomy that suppos-
edly defines current tribal-federal relations. The current legal regime,
however, does not contain the "sufficient precision" to determine the
read them, and they did not tell us truly what was in them. ... When I
reached Washington the Great Father explained to me what the treaty was,
and showed me that the interpreters had deceived me.
P=TER NABAKoV, NATIVE AMERICAN TESrMoNY, A CHRONICLE OF INDIAN-WHrrE RELATIONS
FROM PROPHECY TO THE PRESENT, 1492-1992 118 (1991). For further accounts by Indians,
see id. at 117-44.
158 Lawrey, supra note 57, at 762.
159 A. Lawrence Lowell, The Limits of Sovereignty, 2 HARv. L. REv. 70, 83-84 (1888).
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boundaries of legal authority between the two sovereigns. While the
dual sovereignty approach describes a system that might prove effec-
tive for tribal-federal relations, unfortunately it does not describe the
current legal regime.
Both approaches assume two central requirements that the cur-
rent legal regime lacks: consent and definition. The trust doctrine is
useless without some defined method of application because its scope
can be redefined at will by the more powerful sovereign and without
the consent of the weaker sovereign. The dual sovereignty approach
requires no consent whatsoever and also allows the more powerful
party to define the scope of the sovereign authority possessed by all
concerned entities. These two arguments might, taken together, offer
a workable system for tribal-federal relations. Indeed, when com-
bined they create a solution that is similar to the free association argu-
ment discussed in Part IV of this Note. Although on their face they
appear to be reasonable accommodations of the complexities of In-
dian relations, they are not accurate representations of the current
legal and political regime. In the first instance, any nation that dele-
gates a portion of its sovereign powers to another nation must do so
consensually. Otherwise, the term "trust!' is simply a polite word for
conquest and subjugation. 16 0 As the Supreme Court noted in The
Schooner Exchange, all exceptions "to the full and complete power of a
nation within its own territories must be traced up to the consent of
the nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source." 1 1
Clearly, the Indian nations did not consensually delegate the major
portion of their sovereign authority. Rather, it was taken. 6 2
160 The sincerity of the "trust" doctrine is itself somewhat questionable. Vine Deloria
notes:
Of this great mass of some 4,300 distinct enactments, only a minuscule
number tried to protect the Indians. The vast majority of these laws strip
the tribes of their land, deny rations if they do not work, deny the right of
free speech and freedom of religion, provide for the capture and transpor-
tation of Indian children from their homes, and even try to regulate the
right to bestow personal goods on relatives and friends upon the death of
the Indian. When similar versions of these laws were enacted by Nazi Ger-
many they were not regarded as a clever way to protect the Jewish popula-
tion of Europe.
Deloria, supra note 63, at 207.
161 The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
162 Professor Johnson asserts that "[i] t is absurd to argue that Aboriginal tribes know-
ingly and voluntarily gave up their claims to these lands," and asks:
If the westward-bound settlers in either Canada or the United States had
asked the indigenous occupants whether they would prefer (1) to be re-
moved from ancient homelands, hunting, fishing, and food gathering
grounds, forced often to live on distant, strange, hostile lands, be squeezed
onto tiny reservations with other often incompatible tribes, made totally
dependent on the white man for the most meager of rations, even survival,
and have their cultures, customs, and religions ridiculed, prohibited, and
debased, or (2) remain on their ancestral lands, continue their traditional
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Definition is probably more important to the tribes in the long
run. Both of the arguments described above implicitly assume some
level of agreement between the entities involved. Such an agreement
would set out the powers of the competing sovereigns and establish a
defined relationship between them. The complexity of tribal-state
and tribal-federal relations under the current system "renders imprac-
ticable any effort to set forth a general set of rules which precisely
define the scope of tribal self-government." 163 Thus, the relationship
between the tribes and the federal government is not as well defined
as the above approaches assume.'6 Nor is there any certain division
of tribal, state and federal jurisdiction. 65 As a result of the conflicts
discussed in this Note, the United States government will continue to
erode Indian tribal sovereignty unless a mutually defined structure is
established.
Under the current system of Indian law, Indian sovereignty is an
illusory concept. 166 The key to improving the current state of rela-
tions between the tribal, state and federal governments does not lie in
the case law or legislation within the current legal structure. By cling-
ing to the myth of sovereignty under the "trust" doctrine, the tribes
will allow the erosion of tribal sovereignty to continue until there is
nothing left.'67 To reestablish the sovereign base of the Indian Na-
tions, an entirely new structure must be built for the management of
affairs between the Government of the United States and the Indian
tribes.' 6
8
lifestyles, be treated with dignity and respect, and choose their own time,
place, and method for adopting or rejecting industrialization and techno-
logical advances, does anyone doubt the answer?
Johnson, supra note 4, at 649-50 (footnotes omitted).
163 McCoy, supra note 19, at 389.
164 "[T]here is nothing in the whole compass of our laws so anomalous, so hard to
bring within any precise definition, or any logical and scientific arrangement of principles,
as the relation in which the Indians stand toward this government and those of the States."
William W. Quinn,Jr., Federal Acknowledgement of American Indian Tribes: The Historical Devel-
opment of a Legal Concept, 34 AM. J. LEGAL Hisr. 331 (1990) (citing Hugh S. Legare, U.S.
Attorney General (1841-43)).
165 There is, of course, the split along internal/external lines. However, cases like Col-
ville demonstrate that even this division offers no certain answers. Some have argued that
the mapping out of these separate areas must be done on an ad hoc basis in order to
ensure that all relevant factors are considered in each case. McCoy, supra note 19, at 399
(treating jurisdictional issues in a manner similar to interest analysis in conflict of laws).
This approach, however,-does not protect the sovereign rights of the Indian tribes.
166 "Tribal self-government is a cruel fiction promulgated during the immediate past
half-century with an eye toward improving the image of the government." Deloria, supra
note 63, at 206.
167 "Indian tribes today are believed to be political sovereigns with a vast reservoir of
undetermined powers. This belief is due more to the ranting of Indian militants than to
scholarly research . . . ." Id. at 212.
168 See O'Brien, supra note 24, at 1494 ("The solution to this maze of contradictions
and inconsistencies is for the United States to adopt definitions and procedures which
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III
THE MEANING OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR INDIAN TIBEs
The need for a mutually defined structure in the relationship be-
tween the Indian Nations and the federal government is simply an-
other way to describe the need for the federal government to
recognize the Indians' right of self-determination. 169 This right is well
recognized in international law'70 and is a necessary aspect of the tri-
bal-federal relation if the tribes are to maintain their cultural and
physical existence. The Declaration on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States
in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations' 7 ' states that
"all peoples have the right freely to determine, without external inter-
ference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and
cultural development, and every State has the duty to respect this
right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter."'7 2 The Inter-
national Court of Justice has also recognized the validity of the right
to self-determination. 73 Ian Brownlie states that "[tihe present posi-
tion [in international law] is that self-determination is a legal principle,
and that United Nations organs do not permit Article 2, paragraph
7,174 to impede discussion and decision when the principle is in is-
more closely follow the standards and definitions currently being promulgated at the inter-
national level."); Kronowitz et al., supra note 20, at 622 ("In the federal context, the United
States must recognize that the inherent political rights of Indian nations limit its authority
over Indian peoples. Similarly, Indian-state relations must be based on negotiated agree-
ments that recognize Indian self-government.").
169 Brownlie defines self-determination as "the right of cohesive national groups ('peo-
ples') to choose for themselves a form of political organization and their relation to other
groups." BROWNUE, supra note 75, at 593. See also Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to
Democratic Governance, 86 AM.J. INT'L L. 46, 52 (1992) ("the right of a people organized in
an established territory to determine its collective political destiny.").
170 Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171, 173 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) states that "[a]ll peoples have the
right of self-determination." This treaty has been ratified or acceded to by 113 states as of
November 1991, and is probably binding on the other states as customary law. Franck,
supra note 169, at 58. Some commentators argue, however, that the right to self-determi-
nation for indigenous peoples is not so well established. See, e.g., Lawrey, supra note 57, at
707 ("[I]ts application outside the context of decolonization remains highly problematic,
with no accepted application to indigenous peoples.").
171 GA. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970)
[hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations]. The United States follows the principles
of this Declaration, which was adopted without vote by the United Nations General Assem-
bly. BROWNLE, supra note 75, at 595.
172 Declaration on Friendly Relations. See also U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2 ("To de-
velop friendly relations among nations based upon respect for the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples....").
173 See, e.g., 1971 I.CJ. 16, 31 (Advisory Opinion of June 21); Western Sahara, 1975
I.Cj. 12, 31-33 (Advisory Opinion of October 16).
174 This provision states that
[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Na-
tions to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domesticjuris-
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sue."175 Finally, the U.S. government itself has specifically recognized
tribal self-determination of Indian peoples. 176
Self-determination in colonial times meant that the tribes should
be left alone to develop as they would. In the modem context, how-
ever, the right allows for an entire range of possibilities from secession
to principles of nondiscrimination. 177 Between these two poles are
the concepts of trust, free association, and increased governmental
representation for the self-determination unit. Secession and full
statehood are often viewed as the best examples of self-determination.
Statehood through secession might be the most decisive solution
to the consent and definition problems of tribal-federal relations. Ob-
viously, the tribes would no longer have a consent problem, from their
perspective, if they seceded and formed their own international states.
The definition problem would be solved because the tribes would be
subject to international law, which is based on the concept of protect-
ing state autonomy and sovereignty. In the case of the Indians, how-
ever, these options are neither the most practical nor the most
desirable. Given the physical location of the tribes and the economic
and military disparity between the two entities, secession is not a prac-
tical option nor even a distinct possibility. Although many tribes
could handle statehood from an economic standpoint it is highly
doubtful that they could operate effectively in the international arena.
The problem is one of recognition by the nations of the world.
diction of any state or shall require the Members to submit to such matters
to settlement under the present Charter, but this principle shall not preju-
dice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
175 BROWNLIE, supra note 75, at 595.
176 See, e.g., The Indian Self Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 450(a)-450(n) (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (establishing an Indian "self-determination pol-
icy" that assures Indian participation in the administration of federal services to Indian
communities).
177 Hannum notes that:
The ultimate political status sought by indigenous groups through self-
determination varies tremendously, reflecting the diversity of situations in
which indigenous peoples find themselves and the diverse character of in-
digenous groups themselves. Some groups aspire to complete indepen-
dence and statehood, while others demand autonomy or self-government
only in specific areas, such as full control over land and natural resources.
Hurst Hannum, New Developments in Indigenous Rights, 28 VA.J. INT'L L. 649, 671-72 (1988).
See also Kronowitz et al., supra note 20, at 619 ("IT] he right to political self determination
can be expressed in many different ways, ranging from limited self government to seces-
sion."); Mary Ellen Turpel, Indigenous Peoples' Rights of Political Participation and Self-Determi-
nation: Recent International Legal Developments and the Continuing Struggle for Recognition, 25
CORNELL INT'L LJ. 579, 592 (1992) ("The scope of the right to self-determination will
necessarily differ from case to case. . . ."); BROWNLIE, supra note 75, at 593 ("The choice
may be independence as a state, association with other groups in a federal state, or auton-
omy or assimilation in a unitary state.").
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Article I of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of
States sets out the following qualifications for statehood: (a) a perma-
nent population, (b) a defined territory, (c) government, and (d) ca-
pacity to enter into relations with other states.178 This fourth
qualification poses the problem. Brownlie equates it with the concept
of independence, and asserts that the "question is that of foreign con-
trol overbearing the decision-making of the entity concerned on a
wide range of matters of high policy and doing so systematically and
on a permanent basis. 1 79 The current "trust" relationship between
the Indian tribes and the United States government brings the ques-
tion of independence into serious doubt in the eyes of other nations.
Thus, it is probable that other countries would not recognize the in-
dependent Indian nations, even if they were willing and able to de-
clare themselves as states.' 80
The predominant view in current international law is that the
non-recognition of a state by another state has no effect upon the
legal status of the former.'81 "It would be naive, however, to deny
that, in practice, recognition can have important legal and political
effects.'u8 2 If other nations did not recognize the Indian nations'
claims of independent statehood, which would be likely given their
relationship with the United States, then they would be unable to join
the other nations of the world in the international arena. Further-
more, even if the tribes did have certain rights as states, if they were
not recognized as such there would be no way of enforcing those
rights. Thus, claims of statehood offer little hope for Indians tribes at
the current time.
The international stance on the subject of secession makes it an
even less attractive solution. Under current international law, seces-
178 Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, art. 1, 49 Stat. 3097,
3100, 165 L.N.T.S. 19. For discussion of the four basic criteria for statehood, see BROWN-
UE, supra note 75, at 74-80; CRAwFoRD, supra note 27, at 36-48.
179 BROWNLIE, supra note 75, at 76.
180 Beyond the question of independence and the requirements for statehood is the
obvious matter of political fallout. Allies of the United States are not likely to take a posi-
tion on the statehood of Indian tribes that contradicts the U.S. government's position.
Therefore, they probably would not accept the secession as legitimate. This assumes, of
course, that the United States would not accept a claim of full statehood by the Indian
tribes. The situation would be quite different, however, if the United States did allow such
a claim. Then it would simply be a matter of determining whether or not a tribe meets the
requirements for statehood under international law. If it did, then the tribe could fully
participate in international affhirs. The question remains, however, whether full statehood
would be the best solution for a tribe.
181 This view is known as the declarative view of recognition of states. See, e.g., CRAw-
FORD, supra note 27, at 24.
182 CRAwWORD, supra note 27, at 24. See also Kronowitz et al., supra note 20, at 621
("The enforcement of international law, however, often depends more on political than
legal considerations, because political interests and pressures often determine the effec-
tiveness of international legal norms.").
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sion is not a favored method of self-determination. s3 The Declara-
tion on Friendly Relations, while advancing the right of self-
determination, provides:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as au-
thorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or im-
pair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity or
[sic] sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in
compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determina-
tion of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a govern-
ment representing the whole people belonging to the territory
without distinction as to race, creed or colour.'
8 4
This provision is a strong indicator that the member countries of the
United Nations do not consider secession a viable option for self-de-
termination of peoples. 185 Thus, regardless of the capability of indi-
vidual tribes to declare themselves as states, the member nations of
the United Nations would probably not allow them to secede.
Finally, while the relationship between the Indian tribes and the
federal and state governments has not always been optimal, it is a
foundation upon which a new structure can be built. Given the geo-
graphic, economic, and political relationships, as well as the fact that
Indian peoples, many of whom have developed definite and beneficial
ties to the United States, are scattered throughout the nation, living
both on and off reservations, it would be unproductive and inefficient
to sever these relationships. 18 6 Also, demanding full statehood would
likely cause a very negative reaction in the world community.18 7 Indig-
enous peoples must look for solutions that will attract maximum inter-
national support; full statehood for Indian tribes may be too radical a
183 Franck, supra note 169, at 58-59.
184 Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 171.
185 Indeed, it is the fear of secession itself that accounts for much of the reluctance
among states with indigenous populations to support rights of self-determination.
The concept of self-determination often provokes an immediate negative
reaction that stems from self-determination's linkage with the creation of
new states through decolonization or secession, and because some indige-
nous groups equate self-determination with full independence. This nega-
tive reaction overshadows the possibility of finding acceptable compromises
on forms of internal self-determination that would not threaten the unity of
the state, but that would provide indigenous groups with an effective de-
gree of control over their own destinies.
Lawrey, supra note 57, at 763-64.
186 Since a lot of work has already been done to improve tribal-federal relations, it is
not necessary to undo this work. What is needed is a new structure that will allow this work
to take effect.
187 An example of the likelihood of such a reaction is the initial negative response of
the U.N. to the breakup of Yugoslavia where the concept of territorial integrity was thought
to prohibit secession. See Marc Weller, The International Response to the Dissolution of the So-
cialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 AM.J. INT'L L. 569 (1992).
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notion to garner such support.188 Thus, a non-secessionist solution to
the problem of Indian sovereignty erosion is the most reasonable. The
question still remains, however, as to where within the range of pos-
sibilities this non-secessionist solution falls.
IV
BUILDING THE NEW STRucuRE: A MODEL FOR TiUBAL
SOVEREIGNTY
There have been many proposals to solve the sovereignty
problems outlined above. Some examples include a constitutional
amendment guaranteeing the sovereign status of Indian tribes,8 9 leg-
islative enactments to undo the injustices of the past and provide for
increased representation in the government,190 and increased depen-
dence on and control of the government "trust" relationship.' 9 1 All of
these approaches suffer, however, from the same basic flaw: they
ground themselves in the current system of federal Indian law.192 As
188 Lawrey, supra note 57, at 761.
189 See P,- BARSH & J. HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRES AN POmTICAL LiBERTy
279-83 (1980) (suggesting an amendment recognizing tribes as similar to states). This
particular solution may need to be a part of the free association system. The focus, how-
ever, must be on establishing the tribes as separate entities and requiring the United States
to abide by the free association agreement.
190 The National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) recommends establishing an
Inter-Departmental Council on Indian Affairs and producing a comprehensive federal
American Indian and Native Alaskan policy through appropriate legislation. See NATIONAL
CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS, DISCUSSION PAPER FOR NATIONAL TuIAL LADEmS' MEET-
INGS: 1993 ADMINISTRATION TRANSmON PLAN AND 1993-97 CONGRESSIONAL INriATrvES
(Nov. 1992).
191 Wells, supra note 85 (calling for legislation constraining the plenary power of Con-
gress and increased reliance on the "trust" doctrine).
192 Each of these proposals represents only a single step in defining a new and effective
structure. By themselves, they are not enough. That is not to say, however, that they
should not be part of the new structure. The transformation necessary to restore Indian
sovereignty need not happen all at once. Individual steps grounded in current federal
Indian law can lay the foundation for later change. For example, there is Supreme Court
precedent that offers at least theoretical protection of tribal sovereignty. See, e.g., Merrian
v. Jicacilla Apache Indian Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982) (upholding the tribes right to
levy a severance tax on oil and gas prices, stating that "The power to tax is an essential
attribute of Indian sovereignty because it is a necessary instrument of self-government and
territorial management."); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (Indian
tribes "are unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their mem-
bers and their territory."). There is also hope for greater respect of tribal institutions. See,
e.g., Iowa Mutual Insurance Company v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987) (upholding the au-
thority of tribal courts to determine their own jurisdiction, requiring exhaustion of tribal
remedies before turning to federal courts, and rejecting alleged incompetence of tribal
courts as an exception to the exhaustion requirement).
In addition to promising judicial language, the United States Congress has attempted
to increase tribal self-government by giving greater control of federal financial aid and
programs to tribal government. The Tribal Self-Governance Demonstration Project may
offer a brighter future for tribal sovereignty. For the text of the original program, see Title
III of the Indian Self-Determination Act Amendment of 1988, Pub. L. 100-472. For a brief
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the above discussion indicates, the current system does not adequately
protect the rights of Indian tribes because it is not based upon their
consent and it provides no defined method for dealing with the con-
flicts that threaten tribal sovereignty. Without addressing these two
fundamental problems, approaches that merely doctor the injustices
wrought by the system relieve the symptoms but fail to treat the
disease.
Before discussing an approach that would address these
problems, however, a very basic question must be answered. What in-
centive does the United States have to enter into a new arrangement
with the Indian tribes? 93 The tempting answer is that, beyond the
moral rightness of treating indigenous peoples with dignity, fairness
and respect, there are none. Yet, the United States has at least two
possible incentives, the first being international in nature and the sec-
ond domestic.
In the international arena, the rights of indigenous peoples ap-
pear to be receiving greater attention than ever before. The develop-
ment of international human rights law has created a climate
favorable to action in the area of indigenous rights.194 "It increasingly
is difficult for governments concerned about their human rights im-
age to ignore blatantly the problems of their indigenous peoples....
[T] he 1980s marked the beginning of an unprecedented period of in-
ternational activity on the question of indigenous rights."195 Among
these rights is the right of self-determination. 196 As this right gains
greater stature in the international forum, it will be more difficult for
the United States to ignore its own violations of the principle of self-
structural discussion of the Project, see Deanna Fairbanks, Taking Control of Federal In-
dian Programs: Selected Issues In Contracting Under the Indian Self-Determination Act,
Self-Governance (presented at the Federal Indian Law Conference, April 1, 1993, Albu-
querque, N.M.) (on file with the Cornell Law Review).
Thus, the current federal Indian law system may offer hope for tribal sovereignty.
There must be a final goal, however, which is realistically based on an examination of the
entire system. The free association approach described below offers such a final goal.
193 This question can be expanded to include the tribes as well. Both the federal and
state governments and the Indian tribes lack the political will to change the current legal
regime. The tribes are not willing to give up what has not been taken (this includes the
trust doctrine which many tribal members see as the only thing standing between the tribes
and complete extinction), and the state and federal governments do not mind maintaining
the current state of affairs because they dominate the relationships. Both parties must
abandon these attitudes if tribal-federal-state relations are to improve.
194 See, e.g., Lawrey, supra note 57, at 716.
195 Id. An example of this recent activity is the establishment of the UN Special Work-
ing Group on Indigenous Populations in 1982. Id. at 720. One of the Group's goals is the
development of a declaration on indigenous rights. I. at 721.
196 See supra notes 169-85 and accompanying text (discussing the status of the right of
self-determination in international law).
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determination. The United. States has a definite stake in maintaining
its image as a supporter of international law.
197
Arguably, the United States is already in violation of international
law under the U.N. Charter. Article 73 provides in part:
Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsi-
bilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not
yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the princi-
ple that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are para-
mount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the
utmost, within the system of international peace and security estab-
lished by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of
these territories, and, to this end:
a. to ensure, with due respect for the culture, of the peoples
concerned, their political, economic, social, and educational
advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against
abuses;
b. to develop self-government, to take due account of the
political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the
progressive development of their free political institutions, ac-
cording to the particular circumstances of each territory and its
peoples and their varying stages of advancement .... 198
The United States maintains a "trust" relationship with the tribes, yet
it has not fulfilled the requirements set out above. Whether the con-
cern is international image, violation of international law, or both, the
United States clearly has an incentive under international law to enter
into an agreement that satisfies the self-determination rights of the
Indian tribes, thereby bringing the United States into compliance with
the modern trend of protecting indigenous rights.' 99
The United States government also has an incentive on the do-
mestic front for the development of such an agreement. The current
tribal-federal relationship is a source of great tension between the
tribes and the people of the United States. In addition, the paternalis-
tic approach that the government takes toward the tribes requires
large amounts of federal money to implement. A mutually developed
relationship between the tribes and the United States government
197 If the right of self-determination ever attains the status of customary international
law, the United States will not only have an image problem, but it will actually be in viola-
tion of international law. See Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in
Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations in its Tenth Session, U.N. Comm. on
Human Rights, E/CN.4/Sub. 2/1992/33, Annex I, pp. 44-52 (August 20, 1992). The U.S.
has a strong interest in developing a relationship that will satisfy tribal self-determination
without depriving non-Indian citizens of their rights. It may not have a chance to do so
once the right of self-determination gains strength in international law.
198 U.N. CHARTER art. 73.
199 There is also an obvious prestige value that the United States would receive if it
were among the first nations to establish and provide for the full self-determination of
indigenous peoples within its territory.
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would address both of these concerns to a significant degree. By cre-
ating enforceable expectations for the federal government, the indi-
vidual states, and the tribes, a mutually developed relationship
reduces conflict because all parties have some understanding of their
standing on particular issues. Also, a mutually developed relationship
allows for greater economic development of the tribes, with the ulti-
mate goal being economic self-sufficiency. 200 The United States gov-
ernment could only benefit from such a state of affairs. Because the
needs of both sides could be adequately addressed, a more harmoni-
ous and efficient relationship could be developed to the mutual bene-
fit of the tribes and the United States. Thus, the United States has
both international and domestic incentives to develop a mutually de-
fined and established relationship between the individual Indian
tribes and itself.
The remainder of this section discusses a model for tribal-federal
relations that respects the sovereignty and interests of all concerned
parties. Its basic structure is that of a "free association" patterned, in
part, after the compact of free association between the United States
and the governments of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States
of Micronesia.201 The value of building a system with this structure is
three-fold. First, a free association agreement will comprehensively
define the relationship between the two sovereigns, as well as establish
methods for dealing with possible disputes. Second, the structure of
this relationship comes from international law, and so, brings with it
many aspects of a system that already addresses sovereignty concerns
similar to those plaguing the tribal-federal relationship. Finally, the
Micronesia Agreement came out of the trustee relationship that origi-
nally existed between the two parties. The progression from trust to
free association is analogous to the instant situation.
The complete structure of such an arrangement would be quite
complex, and is beyond the scope of this Note. The following discus-
sion will, however, introduce some of the basic concepts and require-
ments of this form of governmental relationship.
A. The Nature of the Association Agreement
The United Nations' standards on free association, while not
binding on the present situation, are instructive as to the nature of the
potential relationship between the tribes and the United States. Prin-
ciple VII of General Assembly Resolution 1541 sets down the require-
ments for free association:
200 If not self-sufficiency, a greater degree of inter-dependency could replace the al-
most total dependence of the current relationship.




(a) Free association should be the result of a free and volun-
tary choice by the peoples of the territory concerned expressed
through informed and democratic processes. It should be one
which respects the individuality and the cultural characteristics of
the territory and its peoples, and retains for the peoples of the terri-
tory which is associated with an independent State the freedom to
modify the status of that territory through the expression of their
will by democratic means and through constitutional processes.
(b) The associated territory should have the right to determine
its internal constitution without outside interference, in accordance
with due constitutional processes and the freely expressed wishes of
the people. This does not preclude consultations as appropriate or
necessary under the terms of the free association agreed upon.
20 2
These requirements, which stress that the association of the parties
must be voluntary, implicitly recognize the sovereign authority of the
associating state.20 3 Thus, the nature of the agreement starts with
both sides having equal sovereign rights, and then allows for the limi-
tation and bounding of those powers through negotiation. 20 4 This ap-
proach is far more protective than the current ad hoc methods
employed under federal Indian law.20 5 A free association agreement
creates a structure and a process for addressing the concerns of all
parties involved, and thus allows for a mutually derived solution,
rather than a solution imposed by the more powerful sovereign.
B. Who are the Parties?
One of the first structural questions that must be answered is:
Who are the parties to the agreement? The answer depends on
whether each tribe is going to make its own agreement or whether,
perhaps, there will be some new governmental body speaking for the
tribes. Either approach would work, but each would require different
dynamics. For example, the tribes could form a new governing body
202 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
GA. Res. 1541, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Annex, Supp. No. 16, at 29-30, U.N. Doc. A/4684
(1960).
203 In some ways, this system is similar to the internal/external approach set down by
ChiefJustice Marshall. See supra notes 21-41 and accompanying text. The difference is, as
this Note discusses, that Marshall's system was imposed upon the tribes and it did not
define the relationship adequately, allowing it to be modified by years ofjudicial and Con-
gressional manipulation.
204 This is, of course, an assumption. As is discussed above, the Indian tribes do not
currently possess sovereign authority equal to that of the United States. The negotiation of
such an agreement, however, would require that the parties start from a point of equality.
205 "The government's inability to acknowledge or rectify these inconsistencies in ad-
ministering its relationship with American Indians has led to inequitable treatment among
tribes and Indian peoples, has resulted in the courts continuing divestment of tribal au-
thority in an era of self-determination, and has placed the United States in the position of




that would operate along the same lines as the United Nations, with
representatives from each member tribe forming a general legislative
body. The United States could then sign a free association agreement
with that legislative body, thereby streamlining the system. The down-
side to this approach, however, is that the legislative body could not
guarantee adequate representation of each tribe's interests at all
times.20 6 Furthermore, the agreement would have to cover a large
number of vastly different cultures with various individual needs, and
would thus not be specific enough to meet the needs of the different
tribes. This problem could be partially resolved by including a clause
in the agreement to address the changing needs of the various mem-
ber tribes.20
7
Individual free association agreements for each tribe, on the
other hand, would allow each tribe to negotiate its own deal and pro-
tect its individual interests. Unfortunately, this approach would in-
crease the complexity of the system and weaken the position of the
smaller tribes. A small tribe with few resources might not be able to
negotiate as good an arrangement as a tribe with larger numbers and
greater resources. This approach also has the disadvantage of making
it difficult for unrecognized tribes to take part in the system.208
A compromise solution might be the best approach. Tribes with
adequate resources and governmental structure could make individ-
ual agreements with the United States. Additionally, tribes could
form a federation of Indian States whose purpose would be to facili-
tate relations between the United States government and the tribes.
Part of its role as facilitator would be to assist in the development of
those tribes without a self-governing status adequate for individual re-
lations with the federal government.20 9 This organization would have
its own charter and free association agreement, and would consist of
representatives from all member tribes.2 10 Such a structure would
206 There would also be severe problems with respect to that body's ability to bind the
individual tribes. It is doubtful that any tribe would be willing to grant that much authority
to such an organization. This problem is the same as that encountered in the United
Nations.
207 The following is one possible example of such a provision:
The various member tribes may, in recognition of the different and chang-
ing needs of the individual nations, make separate agreements on matters
of mutual concern with the federal and state governments. These separate
agreements are valid only insofar as they do not conflict with the general
language and purposes of this Compact.
208 The United States government would probably be unwilling to negotiate agree-
ments with tribes that it no longer recognizes as separate governmental entities.
209 Thus, the federation would take on a protectorate role by assuring the rights and
interests of those tribes that lack adequate resources, governmental structure, or formal
recognition by the federal government.
210 An important question at this point is: Who will represent each tribe? It is unclear
in many cases what governmental body leads an individual tribe. Various factions may
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combine the strengths of both systems and could greatly further the
interests of Indian peoples.
C. What Should the Agreement Cover?
The specifics of each free association agreement would vary ac-
cording to the needs of the tribe. Several items, however, would be
central to all of them. In the case of the agreement between the pro-
posed federation of Indian states and the federal government, the
agreement would cover some of the basic items that are appropriate
to all tribes.21' The following are some of the issues that should be
addressed in all free association agreements. 12
A Statement of Voluntary Association. All agreements would begin
with a statement of the sovereign status of the tribe and its voluntary
entrance into the agreement. This item is of great importance be-
cause it forces both sides to acknowledge the status of the tribe. It is
through this section of the compact that the consent of the tribes
would be injected back into the system, for without consent, there is
no sovereignty. This statement would establish the government-to-
government nature of the agreement.
A statement of voluntary association would be most effective as
the preamble to the entire agreement. While the body of the agree-
ment would map out the boundaries of tribal and federal sovereignty,
the preamble would set the tone of the entire relationship. In the
long run, as the tribes and the United States government adjust the
terms and specifics of their relationship, it will be this statement of
sovereignty that continues to provide the framework of sovereignty
and the tribal-federal relationship. The following is one example of a
preamble to a free association agreement.
PREAMBLE
The Government of the United States of America and the Govern-
ment of the [Name of Tribal Nation];
represent very different views on the needs and future of the tribe. This situation is often
the result of federal control over tribal life. In the end, this is a question that each tribe
must answer.
211 For example, the agreement might include a provision defining the citizenship of
all Indian peoples under this new regime. Another appropriate provision for this agree-
ment would be a section discussing the terms and methods for bringing unrecognized or
underdeveloped tribes into the new system. One very important provision which would be
quite appropriate in the association agreement of the federation of Indian States, would
determine the meaning and scope of the term "tribal land." For example, would the term
mean trust land held by the tribe itself, tribal and allotted trust land, or all land within
reservation boundaries?
212 This Section discusses sample provisions that suggest possible answers to the issues
presented. Given the highly complex and varying needs of the different tribes, it would be




Affirming that their Nations are founded upon respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, and that all peo-
ples have the right to freely determine their own destinies and to
enjoy self-government;
213
Affirming the common interests of the United States of
America and the [Name of Tribal Nation] in creating close and mu-
tually beneficial relationships through free and voluntary associa-
tion of their respective Governments;
Affirming the interest of the Government of the United States
of America in promoting the economic advancement and self-suffi-
ciency of the people of the [Name of Tribal Nation];
Recognizing that the [Name of Tribal Nation] have and retain
their sovereignty and their sovereign right to self-determination and
the inherent right to adopt and amend their own Constitutions and
forms of government;
Recognizing that the approval of the entry of their Government
into this Compact of Free Association by the people of the [Name of
Tribal Nation] constitutes an exercise of their sovereign right to self-
determination;
2 14
NOW, THEREFORE, AGREE to enter into a relationship of
free association which provides a full measure of self-government
for the peoples of the [Name of Tribal Nation]; and
FURTHER AGREE that the relationship of free association de-
rives from and is set forth in this Compact; and that during such
relationship of free association, the respective rights and responsi-
bilities of the Government of the United States and the Government
of the [Name of Tribal Nation] in regard to this relationship of free
association derive from and are as set forth in this Compact.
Terms of Economic Relations and Assistance. The various tribes will
require economic assistance to further their development. Currently,
most tribes receive federal funding for various projects and needs.
The purpose of this section would be to transfer the economic rela-
tionship to the new system.21 5 In this section, detailed descriptions of
the rights and obligations of both parties with respect to economic
matters such as powers of taxation,2 16 methods of economic develop-
213 This paragraph is an explicit recognition of the tribes' right of self determination.
With this statement in place, the status of the right of self-determination in international
law is irrelevant. The rights of the tribe under this principle are guaranteed by United
States domestic law.
214 This paragraph operates as an admission by the tribe that their act of entering into
this agreement satisfies their rights of self-determination. Thus, it protects the United
States government from claims of violation of that right.
215 This section might also contain provisions for modifring the terms of economic
assistance as the tribe becomes more self-sufficient.
216 A provision on taxation would be crucial to the success of a free association agree-
ment. Tribes would have to be completely certain of their rights and obligations in order
to develop viable economic development plans.
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ment, and business regulations,217 would also be included. For exam-
ple, the following taxation provision might be appropriate:
All tribal lands, activities and peoples will be immune from any state
taxation not specifically provided for in this Agreement or in a
Tribe-State Compact218 established under the procedures set forth
in this Agreement.219
LegislativeJurisdiction. The agreement must set forth in detail the
rights and obligations of both parties with respect to criminal codes,
governmental regulations, statutes, and other legislation. Without
these specifications, the sovereign power of the parties would be unde-
fined. For example, in order to avoid future conflict, the agreement
must state whether a tribe can prosecute a nonmember. Another ex-
ample is the question of whether a tribe has foreign sovereign immu-
nity. These matters could be solved simply by adopting current
federal law, or they could be individually negotiated. Implicit in this
idea is the fact that the agreement must include a provision which
holds that all previously applicable federal and state law not explicitly
incorporated into the agreement would be void. This provision is ab-
solutely necessary if the parties are to start with a clean slate between
them.220 Consider the following example of such a provision.
The parties to this Agreement recognize the sovereign status of
the various Native American Nations. Therefore, except as may be
specifically provided for in this Agreement, all previous sources of
legal authority between the [Name of Tribal Nation] and the United
States of America are rendered null and void. This provision in-
217 See, e.g., Micronesia Agreement, supra note 201, § 177(c), 99 Stat. at 1812 (provid-
ing a $150 million grant to the government of the Marshall Islands). Other provisions
necessary for the Indian Agreement would be yearly appropriations for each tribe, guaran-
tees of services, and standards for assistance requests.
218 The purpose of this exception is to allow the tribes and the states to enter into
mutually beneficial arrangements when such opportunities present themselves. For exam-
ple, tribal members might opt to pay state income taxes in return for full state services on
the reservation.
219 Federal taxation of Indian tribes would be a complex question under this type of
agreement. One solution would be to agree upon dual tribal-federal citizenship of Indi-
ans. These individuals would then be subject to federal taxation but could get credit for
any taxes paid to the tribal government.
220 See, e.g., Micronesia Agreement, supra note 201, § 171, 99 Stat. at 1810 providing
that
Except as provided in this Compact or its related agreements, the ap-
plications of the laws of the United States to the Trust Territory of the Pa-
cific Islands by virtue of the Trusteeship Agreement [the prior arrangement
between the parties] ceases with respect to the Marshall Islands and the
Federated States of Micronesia as of the effective date of this Compact.
This is not to say, of course, that all of the hard won tribal-state agreements must be elimi-
nated. Appropriate state law could be reincorporated into the new system through tribal-
state compacts.
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cludes any and all federal and state common law, legislation or
other agreements not specifically provided for herein.
2 21
The parties further recognize that the above statement requires
that the government of the United States of America affirmatively
renounce the plenary power of the federal government over Indian
Affairs, and that the individual states possess no power whatsoever
over the tribes unless the tribe agrees to such power in a tribe-state
compact.
222
The parties further agree that no new legislation affecting any
of the rights or obligations established herein or under any further
agreement or compact provided for under the procedures of this
Agreement will take effect without a formal mediation between the
parties.
2 23
The parties further acknowledge that the rights and obligations
created by the Agreement are self-executing. The parties accept the
jurisdiction of the courts of either party with respect to disputes aris-
ing under this Agreement or any collateral agreement provided for
in this Agreement.
2 24
In the event that a judgment in the courts of either party is
offensive to the rights of either sovereign, that party may resort to
the dispute resolution methods provided for herein.
Dispute Resolution and Modifications. It is inevitable in a contract of
this scope that there will be disputes over ambiguous or omitted provi-
sions. Additionally, there will always be new matters of mutual con-
cern that require either modification of the agreement or creation of
a collateral agreement. Therefore, a method of dispute resolution
must be established. The best approach would be a system of confer-
ence and mediation. Although the details of such mediation should
be negotiated, it is clear that a mediation method would help insure
that the parties meet as equals.
The content of this section would vary greatly with each agree-
ment. The differing cultural, economic, and political systems of the
221 The implications of this provision would be far reaching. It would void not only
laws which were detrimental to the tribes but also those which were favorable. This situa-
tion would force both sides to completely re-examine the relationship and to negotiate
those points which each felt were important.
222 This clause, while a logical outcome of the previous clause, should be explicitly
stated in all agreements so as to assure that the plenary power doctrine can never be inter-
preted back into the relationship.
223 This provision is primarily aimed at the United States government. It is an attempt
to provide some assurance that the federal government will not unilaterally alter the agree-
ment. A free association between the tribes and the United States will operate properly
only if all parties agree to be bound.
224 It is likely that neither party would want collateral agreements to be self-executing
in all circumstances. This provision should allow for explicit statements in collateral agree-
ments disallowing self-execution of that agreement or parts thereof. Another concern that
might be addressed by this section would be whether individuals had standing to raise
claims under the Free Association Agreement.
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various tribes would require each agreement to adopt a different ap-
proach. There would be, however, some structural similarities. Each
agreement would have to address the selection of a facilitator for the
mediation and would have to establish a system for the development
of collateral agreements and amendments. Any sample provision in
this section would be totally speculative. Although they may or may
not be directly applicable, the following provisions, taken directly
from the Micronesia agreement, are instructive.
22 5
The Government of the United States shall confer promptly at
the request of the Government of the Marshall Islands or the Feder-
ated States of Micronesia and any of those Governments shall con-
fer promptly at the request of the Government of the United States
on matters relating to the provisions of this Compact or of its re-
lated agreements.
In the event the Government of the United States, or the Gov-
ernment of the Marshall Islands or the Federated States of Microne-
sia, after conferring pursuant to Section 421, determines that there
is a dispute and gives written notice thereof, the Governments
which are parties to the dispute shall make a good faith effort to
resolve the dispute among themselves.
If a dispute... cannot be resolved within 90 days of written
notification in the manner provided in Section 422, either party to
the dispute may refer it to arbitration in accordance with Section
424.
Should a dispute be referred to arbitration as provided for in
Section 423, an Arbitration Board shall be established for the pur-
pose of hearing the dispute and rendering a decision which shall be
binding upon the two parties to the dispute unless the two parties
mutually agree that the decision shall be advisory.226
Tribal-State-Federal Relationships. Because the Indian nations are lo-
cated throughout the various states of the union, it will be necessary to
establish the scope of authority at the tribal, federal, and state levels.
For example, the agreement could provide for compacts with the state
in which a tribe resides. These compacts should be separate agree-
ments, negotiated with the individual states, that govern relationships
that are best left between the state and the tribe.227 For example, a
225 A central aspect of the dispute resolution agreement provision is fairness. The
agreement would have to establish methods for assuring that the United States did not
dominate the negotiations because of its superior position. The parties might request
United Nations supervision of all proceedings. This would help to assure that all parties
involved acted in good faith.
226 Micronesia Agreement, supra note 201, §§ 421-424, 99 Stat. at 1827-28. Other pro-
visions include instructions for selecting an arbitration board, voting guidelines, allowance
for reference to international law, and cost provisions.
227 The Indian Gaming Regulation Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (3) (A) (1988),
offers a good example of how these compacts might work:
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tribe might make a compact with the state to establish mutual local
law enforcement.228 The agreement would need to establish a
Any Indian tribe having jurisdiction over the Indian lands upon which a
class III gaming activity is being conducted, or is to be conducted, shall
request the State in which such lands are located to enter into negotiations
for the purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact governing the con-
duct of gaming activities. Upon receiving such a request, the State shall
negotiate with the Indian tribe in good faith to enter into such a compact.
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (3) (A) (1988). The IGRA sets out the scope of the Tribal-State com-
pact as follows:
(C) Any Tribal-State compact negotiated under subparagraph (A) may in-
clude provisions relating to-
(i) the application of the criminal and civil laws and regulations of the In-
dian Tribe or the State that are directly related to, and necessary for, the
licensing and regulation of such activity;
(ii) the allocation of criminal and civil jurisdiction between the State and
the Indian tribe... ;
(iii) the assessment by the State of such activities in such amounts as are
necessary to defray the costs of regulating such activities;
(iv) taxation by the Indian tribe of such activity...;
(v) remedies for breach of contract;
(vi) standards for the operation of such activity...;
(vii) any other subjects that are directly related to the operation of gaming
activities.
Id. at § 2710(d) (3) (c) (i-vii). These provisions allow for a compact which completely de-
scribes the obligations and rights of all interested parties with respect to the issue of gam-
ing. The negotiations would reflect the various interests of the state and the tribe. Similar
compacts could be arranged in other areas including: social services, law enforcement,
education, and medical services.
The IGRA mandates a compact between the tribe and the state before gambling can
take place. There is some question as to the scope of a state's authority to make agree-
ments with tribes absent a congressional mandate or subsequent congressional approval.
See Kronowitz et al., supra note 20, at 584-85. In addition, the IGRA requires a compact
before tribes can carry out class III gaming, and thus mandates an abrogation of tribal
sovereignty. These matters of state and federal authority would be eliminated, however,
under a free association agreement. The federal government could explicitly allow for
compacts in the agreement and, if necessary, set down requirements for their validity. It
would be up to Congress and the states to work out how to implement such a system by
enacting legislation. One example of how this could be set up is the Tribal-State Compact
Act, introduced, but not passed, in Congress in 1978. See id. (citing Tribal-State Compact
Act of 1978: Hearings on S.2502 before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3-11 (1978)) ("The Tribal-State Compact Act was intended to provide clear
federal authorization to Indian nations and the states.., to enter into agreements which
would apply civil, criminal and regulatory laws of the tribe or the state government over
Indians or non-Indians as the parties saw fit to agree.").
For a discussion of other examples of compacting, see Michael Minnis, Tribal-State
Compacting In Oklahoma (presented to the Federal Bar Association's Annual Indian Law
Seminar, April 2, 1993) (on file with author).
228 There are many areas in which states and Indian nations have found their
jurisdictional authority in conflict and they are discovering areas in which
the mutual advantage of each is potentially served by entering into negoti-
ated agreements. Such cooperative agreements between states and tribes
have already been negotiated in an effort to address daily problems that
both governments face such as law enforcement, delivery of social services,
and hunting and fishing regulation. For example, in the area of law en-
forcement, cross-deputization of law officers has been used as an efficient
and economical initiative in many areas.
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method for making these compacts and determining their allowable
scope. The agreement could also provide for collateral agreements
with the federal government, as previously discussed. A clause al-
lowing for tribal-state compacts might state as follows:
The State in which the tribe resides shall have no governmental
authority over the tribe and its laws shall have no effect within the
boundaries of tribal land absent a specific provision in this
agreement. 2
29
The Tribe and the State in which it resides may make separate
compacts with respect to matters of mutual concern provided that it
does not conflict with the language or purposes of this Free Associa-
tion Agreement or other tribal-federal collateral agreements. 230
The procedures for making a Tribal-State Compact will follow
the agreement-making procedures set down in this Agreement.
Furthermore, such Compact will be self-executing as between the
tribe and the state subject to any express provision to the contrary.
These compacts would have the important effect of allowing the
tribes and the states to develop mutually beneficial working relation-
ships. These relationships would enable the individual tribes to as-
sume greater control over their destiny. Mutually beneficial
relationships would also help to lessen the tension between the tribes
and the states, creating a more cooperative co-existence. When con-
flicts did occur, the tribe and the state would be in a better position to
create a solution acceptable to all parties.
These are only some of the areas that would have to be covered in
individual free association agreements. By fully elaborating the rights,
duties and obligations of the tribal, state and federal entities, free as-
sociation agreements would protect tribal authority from arbitrary
modification by the United States government. As a result, the tribes
would exercise greater control over their own destiny. In addition,
the Indian peoples brought under this legal regime would have a
greater affinity for the new system because it would be the result of
their own efforts, rather than the fiat of a greater power. Thus, the
system would be both consensual and well-defined. It would re-estab-
lish the sovereign base of the tribes, which, in turn, would provide the
platform for a stronger, more fruitful relationship, less prone to re-
sentment and ideological conflict, between the Indian tribes and the
people and government of the United States of America.
Kronowitz et al., supra note 20, at 584-85 (citations omitted).
229 This provision is necessary to establish the independence of the tribe from the
state. Thus, any dealings between the tribe and state will be on an equal basis.
230 This provision recognizes the pre-emptive effect of federal law with respect to the
states. Federal arrangements with the tribes take priority over state arrangements.
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D. How Would The System Work?
There is no doubt that setting up a free association agreement
and creating a federation of Native American tribes would be a monu-
mental task. Once in place, however, it would produce beneficial re-
sults for the tribes and the United States when conflicts arise. The
effect of a free association agreement within the context of tribal-fed-
eral relations would be to establish a system of dual sovereignty, as
described by A. Lawrence Lowell.23' The difference between the cur-
rent system and the proposed one is that the boundaries of authority
for both parties would be specifically delineated by a free association
agreement. In addition, for the first time in the history of modem
tribal-federal relations, the boundaries of authority between the tribes
and the federal government would be mutually established and ac-
cepted. Thus, all relations between the tribal government and the
federal and state governments would have a fixed starting point.
From this known point of departure, the parties could launch into the
mutual development of solutions to problems that arise. The three
cases discussed above offer excellent examples for exploring the oper-
ation of a free association agreement. How would these matters have
been decided if a free association agreement had been in place?
Under a free association agreement, the situation in Lone Wo/ 232
would have been much different. This case provides an example of a
situation in which the United States government and the Kiowa and
Comanche Tribes would have to establish a collateral agreement with
respect to the land concerned. 23 3 Because a free association agree-
ment explicitly denies the plenary authority of Congress, the collateral
agreement would have to be freely and fully negotiated and could not
be unilaterally modified. Thus the agreements over land and mone-
tary allocations could not have been changed by Congress without the
express consent of the tribe. The argument that the "dependent na-
ture" of the tribes gave Congress the power to abrogate agreements
would fail. Under the free association agreement, the parties would
have negotiated on an equal basis, so neither party would have been
able to unilaterally change the collateral agreement without nullifying
it.
The sequence of events necessary to establish a collateral agree-
ment in these circumstances provides insight into the radical differ-
ence between the current legal regime and a system based on free
231 See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
232 See supra notes 84-103 and accompanying text.
233 With a free association agreement in place, the focus of this dispute would have
been the acquisition of tribal lands for non-Indian settlement and the compensation of the
tribes. Internal organization, allotment of lands to individuals, and other matters of tribal
governance would be under the explicit control of the tribes.
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association. The United States government would first have to recog-
nize the need for more land for settlement. It would then have to
request negotiations with the tribe for the sale of the desired land.
The negotiations might stop at that point because it is reasonably pos-
sible that the tribes would not wish to sell the land. Indeed, unlike
under the current regime, the tribes would have the power to make
that choice. At this juncture, the only options for the U.S. would be to
take the land by force or abrogate the entire free association agree-
ment. Given the probable negative reaction in U.S. society and the
world, the United States would be unlikely to take such drastic meas-
ures. If, on the other hand, the tribes wished to sell the land, the
parties could reach a mutually acceptable agreement.
Oliphant234 and Colvile2 35 offer good examples of situations in
which the tribes and the state and federal governments would assign
jurisdiction in the original association agreement or in subsequent
compacts. In Oliphant, the decision would turn on whether the agree-
ment discussed tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers. If it had, the
matter would be resolved simply by reference to the language of the
agreement. If the agreement did not cover the matter, the tribe, as a
sovereign power would have jurisdiction because the free association
agreement voids all previous laws not explicitly adopted. If this out-
come concerned the federal government, then it could request nego-
tiations for an amendment or collateral agreement.
The situation in Colville would be dealt with under the provision
in the free association agreement that allowed compacts between the
states and the tribes. The actual decision in this matter could go
either way. If Washington wanted a tax, it would negotiate with the
tribe. For example, in exchange for the tribe allowing the State of
Washington to collect the revenue, Washington could provide road
maintenance services on specified reservation highways. A simpler
agreement might be to share the tax revenues. The critical idea is
that the tribe would be negotiating a mutual agreement instead of
having a rule unilaterally imposed upon it by the federal government.
It is quite possible that Washington would still collect the tax. It
would be collected, however, with the agreement of the tribe and in
exchange for some valuable consideration. This outcome would be
an exercise of sovereign authority by the tribe, not an affront to or an
abridgment of tribal sovereignty by an outside force. Thus, the pro-
cess would assure that in reaching a solution the rights of all con-
cerned sovereigns would be protected.
In all three of the cases discussed above, it is possible that the
negotiated outcomes under the free association agreement would be
234 See supra notes 104-23 and accompanying text.
235 See supra notes 124-50 and accompanying text.
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the same as the judicial decisions reached under the current re-
gime.23 6 The free association approach, however, is preferable be-
cause it leaves the sovereign authority of the Indian nations intact and
provides them with a means of exercising freedom of choice with re-
spect to decisions about their future. Mutual agreement is the hall-
mark of relations between states. While any single agreement might
be more advantageous to one party than the other, the value in main-
taining tribal control over Indian affairs, in the long run, would out-
weigh the disadvantages of individual agreements. Indeed, the
compromise necessary to reach a consensus offers the best proof that
the sovereignty of all concerned parties remains intact. No party may
simply impose its will upon the other. Under such a regime, Justice
Marshall's assurance that a state does not give up its sovereignty sim-
ply because it delegates some of its authority to a stronger state237 be-
comes more than empty rhetoric.
E. Would the System Work?
Regardless of the actual form, content or impact of these agree-
ments, their adoption would result in a voluntary relationship that bal-
ances the needs of both parties. There are," however, some major
difficulties with such a system. One possible complaint is that the sys-
tem is too complex to implement in any satisfactory way. Another
problem is that once the system is implemented there is no way of
assuring that the United States will not use its powerful position to
dominate the relationship, as it has in the past.28 8 Indeed, there
would seem to be no way of assuring that the United States could not
unilaterally modify the agreement, or simply abrogate it entirely.
There are no easy answers to these problems. That does not mean,
however, that the attempt to make tribal-federal relations more equi-
table should be abandoned.
The first problem is less troublesome than the second. Complex-
ity alone would not necessarily preclude the implementation of such a
system. It would be comparable to the complexity that currently exists
in the system of agreements governing relations between the United
States and other nations.23 9 The development should be gradual, with
small steps laying the foundation for later developments. For exam-
236 Except, of course, the power of Congress to unilaterally change an agreement
would not be recognized.
237 Worcester, 31 U.S. at 560-61, discussed supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
238 One can question whether this power imbalance will even allow the initial develop-
ment of an equitable system.
239 Actually, one of the reasons that this proposal represents such a monumentally
complex task is that the current system is so inadequate that it is difficult to see where one
must start in dismantling it. If the parties were starting fresh and on equal footing, then
the path to an agreement would be much clearer.
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ple, the first task might be to set up a federation of Native American
nations. 240 With such an organization in place, negotiations could
take place with the United States government while the federation
helps tribes to prepare for individual negotiations. 241 Although this
process would be slow, it would allow for the formation of a solid sov-
ereign base upon which the rest of the system could stand. With a
solid foundation in place, the rest of the system would simply require
negotiation and organization. Tools for these processes already exist
in international relations, providing excellent models for
development.
242
The second problem can be restated as follows: How can we
make sure that the United States will act in good faith with respect to
the Indian tribes, or, how will the agreement be enforced? Given the
history of Indian-federal relations, this is a valid concern. In some
respects, there is no good answer to this problem. There is little that
the tribes could do if the United States decided that it no longer
wished to abide by its agreements. 243 There are, however, several ways
of attempting to assure that the parties abide by the agreement.
First, the agreement itself would have a dispute resolution mecha-
nism. 244 This provision offers a system for enforcing the agreement
internally. The system assumes, however, that the parties will abide by
the agreement If they do not, the agreement cannot enforce itself.
Beyond internal mechanisms, there is an international method of en-
forcement available. The parties could issue unilateral declarations of
intent to be bound by the agreement and that the agreement will not
240 There is already at least one organization of this nature in existence. The National
Congress of American Indians (NCAI) is an inter-tribal organization established in 1944 to
promote and advance the interests of its member tribes as sovereign nations. Under the
current regime, it can act only as a lobbying organization. The NCAI has no real power
over Indian affairs. It does, however, represent a first step towards establishing a system for
the efficient organization of the tribes, such as the one described. The NCAI could take
on a greater role if the individual tribes would vest it with more authority and provide
more support for its operations. See NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AmERICAN INDIANS, DISCUSSION
PAPER FOR NArroNAL TRimAL LEADERS' MEETINGS: 1993 ADMrNISTRATION TRANSITION PLAN
AND 1993-97 CONGRESSIONAL INrTATIVES 1-2 (1992).
241 The most important first task of this organization might be to facilitate the develop-
ment of an agenda acceptable to all of the member tribes. Such a clear statement of the
purposes and goals of Indian peoples would be crucial to an endeavor of this magnitude.
The NCAI has already begun the development of an action plan for the Clinton adminis-
tration. Id at 3-10.
242 Australia is currently grappling with the problems of establishing a treaty relation-
ship with the aboriginal populations of that country. For an insightful analysis of the
problems inherent in this situation, see Lawrey, supra note 57 at 753-61 (discussing the
Australian attempts to establish a treaty between the government and the aboriginal
peoples).
243 A new constitutional amendment which recognizes and assures the sovereign status
of Indians would, of course, restrict Congress from violating the principle of tribal
sovereignty.
244 See supra notes 225-26 and accompanying text.
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be modified or abrogated unilaterally. Such a declaration, if made by
a representative of the United States before the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly, would be binding under international law.245 Thereaf-
ter, if the United States violated the agreement, there would be
grounds for international action.246 While there may be other possi-
ble international enforcement methods, 247 this would be the most ef-
fective approach.
248
The problem of enforcement is difficult in the context of this
type of agreement.249 Even if the United States made the agreement
internationally binding through a unilateral declaration, it is question-
able whether there would be any real means of enforcing it. This ar-
gument, however, is available whenever there is an agreement
between nations. At some point, it becomes necessary to assume that
a nation will keep its promises. 250 Without this assumption, there can
be no international relationships, nor can there ever be any relation-
ship between the United States and the Indian tribes that is not
245 In Nudear Tests (Austi. v. Fr.), 1974 I.CJ. 253 (Sec. 20), the International Court of
Justice held:
It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts, con-
ceming legal or factual situations, may have the effect of creating legal obli-
gations .... When it is the intention of the State making the declaration
that it should become bound according to its terms, that intention confers
on the declaration the character of legal undertaking, the State being
thenceforth legally required to follow a course of conduct consistent with
the declaration. An undertaking of this kind, if given publicly, and with an
intent to be bound, even though not within the context of international
negotiations, is binding.
Id. at 267.
246 There is some question, however, whether a third party would have standing to
bring an action against the United States in the International Court ofJustice. See Lawrey,
supra note 57, at 775-77 (discussing grounds to decline jurisdiction based on the standing
of the party initiating the action).
247 Some other methods could include: inviting scrutiny by the U.N. Working Group
on Indigenous Populations, international arbitration, and requesting the "good offices" of
international authorities to assist with dispute resolution. See generally Lawrey, supra note
57, at 769-76 (discussing various methods for generating international scrutiny to enforce
an agreement such as the one recommended in this Note).
248 In reality, the most effective enforcement would come from continuing negotia-
tions and discussions between the parties. Thus, a combination of many enforcement tech-
niques would be necessary.
249 In this way, the legal system proposed in this Note may not seem very different
from the early treaties between the Europeans and the Indian tribes. The modem legal
environment, however, is less accepting of the total abrogation of all duties under treaties
and international agreements.
250 The presumption that a nation will abide by its agreements is contained in the
international legal principle of pacta sunt servanda: "[a] treaty in force is binding upon the
parties and must be performed by them in good faith." BROWNUE, supra note 75, at 613
(citing the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 26, U.N. Doc. A/
CoNF. 39/27).
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grounded in conquest. There is hope in the words of Justice Black:
"Great nations, like great men, should keep their word."251
CONCLUSION
This Note challenges the traditional manner of viewing Indian
sovereignty. Indeed, it recognizes that as long as a more powerful sov-
ereign is able to redefine the concept at will, Indian sovereignty is an
illusion. The conflicts inherent in the current relationship between
the United States and the Indian nations are the result of the place-
ment of one nation under the authority of another without defining
the resulting relationship and without the consent of the "dependent
nation." The sovereignty of the weaker nation exists merely at the
sufferance of the stronger nation. Because of the nature of that rela-
tionship, the current system cannot provide the structure for the re-
establishment of Indian sovereignty.
While the solution to this problem does not lie within the imme-
diate legal regime, it also does not lie completely outside of current
legal boundaries. The needs of the Indian nations will not be met by
attempting to establish separate and independent nations. The an-
swer lies in a system that will allow the United States government and
the Indian tribes to interact in a manner that is neither totally sepa-
rate nor totally united. A new structure must be built and mutually
enacted to rebuild the sovereignty base of the tribes and grant them
greater autonomy. It must also create a bond between the tribes and
the United States that will enable them to work for their mutual bene-
fit. This structure can be achieved through free association agree-
ments.
James A. Caseft
251 Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960)
(Black, J., dissenting).
t The author would like to thank Derril Jordan, Chris Stearns, Dean Suagee, John
Tahsuda and Professor David Wippman for extensive comments on earlier drafts of this
Note. All errors are, of course, the author's own.
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